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Abstract
Rule 11 bis forms a cornerstone of the ICTY’s completion strategy. Part I of this Article
provides an analysis of the elements of the rule. This Part will highlight the purpose of Rule 11
bis, offer an overview of the legal basis through which the transfer of jurisdiction has taken place
in the ICTY, discuss the referral process and the elements necessary for a successful referral, and,
finally, round out the discussion with an overview of the decision making process of the referral
bench in identifying which state is suitable to proceed with a trial once it is determined that the
indictment is compatible with the referral. Part II discusses the relevance of applicable substantive
law and its importance to the decisions of the referral bench, particularly in the determination
of a state’s ability to meet fair trial standards and to provide appropriate punishments. This Part
also points out the potential problems that national courts will face when examining applicable
substantive law. Part III highlights the tensions that could arise between Rule 11 bis and the
right to a fair trial, quality of prisons, and other issues that surround sentencing. Finally, Part IV
draws attention to the discretionary powers of the prosecutor to monitor the proceedings before
the national courts.
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PROCESS OF REFERRALS TO NATIONAL
COURTS IN ICTY JURISPRUDENCE
Olympia Bekou*
INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2007, Radovan Stanković escaped from the state
police van transferring him to Sarajevo for dental treatment at a
local hospital.1 He was the first indictee to have been transferred
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY” or “Tribunal”) to Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial by a
national court.2 This transfer was made possible by virtue of Rule
11 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(“RPE”) (“Rule 11 bis”), which allows for the transfers of
indictments to the national level.3 As the end of the Tribunal’s
life looms in the distance, the use of Rule 11 bis forms an
important part of its “completion strategy.”4 A number of
* School of Law, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom; Head, International
Criminal Justice Unit, Human Rights Law Centre. I would like to thank David Krivanek,
Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, and David Hayes for their research assistance. All errors and
omissions are attributed to the Author alone.
1. See Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Org. for Sec. and Co-operation in Eur.
[OSCE], Sixth Report in the Case of Convicted Person Radovan Stankovic Transferred to the
State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis at 2 (2007), available at http://www.oscebih.org/
documents/14067-eng.pdf.
2. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo. [ICTY], Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina Renders First Judgment in a Case Transferred by the Tribunal,
No. JP/MOW/1126e (Nov. 14, 2006).
3. See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 11 bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.44 (Dec.
10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules] (providing guidelines for the transfer of cases from
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY” or “Tribunal”)
to domestic courts). Rule 11 bis, which was adopted in 1997 and amended several times
thereafter, is found in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) for both the ICTY
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (“ICTR”). The language of 11 bis
in the RPE of the ICTR, however, is different from that of the ICTY. Compare id., with
Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 11 bis
(Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/080314/080314.pdf
[hereinafter ICTR Rules].
4. E.g., S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (setting
deadlines for the ICTY to conclude investigations, trial, and work, respectively); see also
S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004) (requiring periodic updates
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referrals to courts in the former Yugoslavia have already taken
place.5 Referrals from the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (“ICTR”) are also underway.6
While Stanković’s escape is by no means unique, it has
sparked debate as to the suitability of national courts to deal with
cases originating at the ICTY.7 Stanković’s escape, the acquittal of
from the ICTR and ICTY on the implementation of the completion strategy). For an
analysis of the completion strategy, see Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the
“Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
142, 158 (2005) (concluding that the tribunal needs the full support of the international
community before the completion strategy can be fully implemented). See also Larry D.
Johnson, Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human
Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 158, 158–59 (2005) (arguing
that concerns over inadequate due process and prosecutorial independence resulting
from the completion strategy are unfounded); Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates
of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?, 28
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 591, 591–92 (2005) (suggesting that the closing of the Nuremberg
trials may offer useful guidance for executing the completion strategy); Dominic Raab,
Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy - Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War
Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 82 (2005) (concluding that the
completion strategy of the ICTY “may not be perfect from any single perspective, but it
represents a reasonable compromise between the competing interests and values at
stake”). For a brief overview of the implementation of the completion strategy, see ICTY:
Completion Strategy, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
5. See Key Figures of ICTY Cases (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.icty.org/sid/24. The
indictments of the following individuals have been referred: Rahim Ademi, Gojko
Janković, Dušan Fuštar, Momćilo Gruban, Duško Knežević, Vladimir Kovačevič (Serbia),
Paško Ljubičić, Željko Mejakić, Mirko Norac (Croatia), Mitar Rašević, Radovan
Stanković, Savo Todović (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Milorad Trbić. Id.
6. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision on
Rule 11 bis, Appeal, ¶ 1 (Aug. 30, 2006) (denying the prosecutor’s request for the
transfer of Michel Bagaragaza to Norway for trial); see also Alhagi Marong, The ICTR
Appeals Chamber Dismisses the Prosecutor’s Appeal to Transfer Michel Bagaragaza for Trial to
Norway, ASIL INSIGHTS, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights061003.cfm. An
amended indictment and a different chamber composition have since ordered transfer
of Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for trial. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands (Apr. 13, 2007); see also Alhagi Marong, The ICTR Transfers
Michel Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for Trial, ASIL INSIGHTS, June 18, 2007,
http://www.asil.org/insights070618.cfm. On June 11, 2007, the ICTR Prosecutor
requested the transfer of Flugence Kayishema for trial in Rwanda. See Press Release,
ICTR, ICTR Prosecutor Requests Transfer of First Case to Rwanda, No. ICTR/INFO-9-2525.EN (June 12, 2007).
7. See, e.g., Press Briefing, ICTY, ICTY Weekly Press Briefing – 31st May 2007,
available at http://www.icty.org/sid/9772 (noting that the escape of Radovan Stankovic
would be a factor for the judges making decisions on future cases involving transfers
pursuant to Rule 11 bis). Subsequent requests by the ICTR prosecutor for referral in the
cases of Hategekimana, Kanyarukiga, and Munyakazi were also denied. See Prosecutor v.
Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for
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Ademi,8 the lenient sentencing of Norac,9 and the indictment of
Vladimir Kovačević,10 a defendant with clear mental health
problems,11 all at the domestic level are just some of the matters
deserving of critical attention.
Neither the legal construction of Rule 11 bis nor its practical
application is without problems. The emerging case law
constitutes a good source for understanding the rule’s function
and utility. This Article analyzes the constituting elements of Rule
11 bis and aims to highlight its merits and expose its limitations.
While recognizing that Rule 11 bis constitutes a necessary
process, it is argued that the ICTY has been constrained in its
determinations by the very nature of referrals and the specific
application of the rule.
Rule 11 bis forms a cornerstone of the ICTY’s completion
strategy. Part I of this Article provides an analysis of the elements
of the rule. This Part will highlight the purpose of Rule 11 bis,
offer an overview of the legal basis through which the transfer of
jurisdiction has taken place in the ICTY, discuss the referral
the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, ¶ 78 (June 19, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 78 (June 6, 2008); Prosecutor v.
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for
Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 67 (May 28, 2008).
8. See ICTY, Case Information Sheet: “Medak Pocket” (IT-04-78) Ademi & Norac,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/norac/cis/en/cis-ademinorac.pdf [hereinafter Ademi &
Norac Case Information Sheet] (noting that Rahim Ademi was acquitted after trial in the
Zagreb District Court in Croatia); see also Presuda Županijski sud Zarebu [Zagreb District
Court], br. II K-rz-1/06, May 30, 2008 (Republike Hrvatske v. Ademi & Norac) (Croat.),
available at http://www.centar-za-mir.hr/uploads/PRESUDA_Ademi_i_Norac.pdf.
9. See Ademi & Norac Case Information Sheet, supra note 8 (noting that Mirko Norac
was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment after trial in the Zagreb District Court in
Croatia); see also Presuda Županijski sud Zarebu [Zagreb District Court], br. II K-rz-1/06
(Croat.). For more information on the trial of Ademi and Norac in the Croatian court
system, see Office in Zagreb, OSCE, Ademi-Norac Trial Concluded, Appeal Process Underway,
COURIER, May–Sept. 2008, at 4, available at http://www.osce.org/publications/mc/
2008/10/33920_1197_en.pdf.
10. See Okruzni sud Beogard [Belgrade District Court], Indictment Against
Vladimir Kovačević, No. KTZR 5/07 (July 26, 2007) (Serb.), available at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/o_2007_07_26_eng.pdf. Kovačević’s
case was subsequently adjourned due to his mental state. See Okruzni sud Beogard,
Resenje o odbecivanju optuznice [Resolution of the Indictment Decision], No. KTZR
5/07, Dec. 5, 2007 (Serb.), available at http://okruznisudbg.rs/content/2007godina/
kovacevicvladimir/indictment3/at_downoad.
11. See Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Public Version of the
Decision on Accused’s Fitness to Enter a Plea and Stand Trial, ¶ 50 (Apr. 12, 2006)
(concluding that Kovačević lacks capacity to stand trial before the ICTY).

BEKOU_K-FINAL

726

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

process and the elements necessary for a successful referral, and,
finally, round out the discussion with an overview of the decision
making process of the referral bench in identifying which state is
suitable to proceed with a trial once it is determined that the
indictment is compatible with the referral. Part II discusses the
relevance of applicable substantive law and its importance to the
decisions of the referral bench, particularly in the determination
of a state’s ability to meet fair trial standards and to provide
appropriate punishments. This Part also points out the potential
problems that national courts will face when examining
applicable substantive law. Part III highlights the tensions that
could arise between Rule 11 bis and the right to a fair trial,
quality of prisons, and other issues that surround sentencing.
Finally, Part IV draws attention to the discretionary powers of the
prosecutor to monitor the proceedings before the national
courts.
I.

STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF RULE 11 BIS
A. Purpose of Rule 11 bis

The rationale behind the adoption of Rule 11 bis can be
seen primarily in the Tribunal’s limited life-span. Although its
subsidiary role and practical consequence is involvement of the
national courts in prosecuting and trying persons responsible for
blatant violations of humanitarian and human rights law, its
primary function is freeing up precious Tribunal time.12 With the
ICTY firmly in the final stages of its operation, there is a pressing
need to complete more cases.13 Several other steps have been
taken to enhance the Tribunal’s efficiency, including the
appointment of ad litem judges14 and other internal and external
reforms,15 that aim to meet the 2008–2010 completion
12. See Daryl A. Mundis & Fergal Gaynor, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1134, 1155–57 (2005).
13. Id.
14. See S.C. Res. 1329, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1329 (Nov. 30, 2000).
15. See President of the ICTY, Twelfth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶¶ 7–10, delivered to the
Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2005/532, A/60/267 (Aug. 17,
2005) (citing to the amendment of rules 98 bis and 73(D), the introduction of the
eCourt system, the increased communication between the Association of Defence
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deadlines,16 although reports from the Tribunal’s president and
prosecutor suggest that the ICTY is three to six years behind
Counsel and the Tribunal as well as the Special War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the training of local judges as reforms designed to meet the
completion goals of the ICTY).
16. For the most recent assessment of the status of the completion strategy, see
President, ICTY, Assessment and Report of Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1534 (2004), covering the period from 15 May to
15 November 2009, Letter dated 12 November 2009 from the President of the Int’l
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991,
Addressed to the President of the Security Council [hereinafter Letter dated 12
November 2009], Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/2009/589 (Nov. 13, 2009). The letter is part of a
semiannual series required under Security Council Resolution 1534 that contains
reports from both the president and the prosecutor of the Tribunal. See S.C. Res. 1534,
supra note 4, ¶ 6. A number of past reports were issued pursuant to this authority as well.
See Letter dated 14 May 2009 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President
of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2009/252 (May 18, 2009); Letter
dated 21 November 2008 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security
Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2008/729 (Nov. 24, 2008); Letter dated 13 May 2008
from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for
Serious Violations of Inte’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes
I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2008/326 (May 14, 2008); Letter dated 12 November 2007 from the
President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo.
Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/663 (Nov. 12, 2007); Letter Dated 15 May 2007 from the President of the Int’l
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991,
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2007/283
(May 16, 2007); Letter dated 15 November 2006 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the
President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2006/898 (Nov. 16, 2006);
Letter dated 29 May 2006 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security
Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2006/353 (May 31, 2006); Letter dated 30 November
2005 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible
for Serious Violations of Int’al Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes
I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2005/781 (Dec. 14, 2005); Letter dated 25 May 2009 from the
President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo.
Since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc.
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schedule.17 Nevertheless, the impending termination of the
Tribunal’s operation, combined with a presumed “donor
fatigue,”18 have fostered a shift towards national adjudication of
cases originally intended to be tried internationally.
Lifting some of the burden of the Tribunal’s workload is not
the only function of Rule 11 bis. While the possibility of referrals
is a consequence of the evolving capacity of national courts
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia to deal with complex
cases involving international crimes, referrals are also aimed at
enhancing the national capacity to prosecute the most serious
international crimes. Indeed article 9 of the ICTY Statute
indicates that the Tribunal was not intended to replace or
displace national courts; rather, the Tribunal coexists with
national courts under a system of concurrent jurisdiction.19

S/2005/343 (May 25, 2005); Letter dated 23 November 2004 from the President of the
Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991,
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2004/897
(Nov. 23, 2004); Letter dated 21 May 2004 from the President of the Int’l Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 1991, addressed to the President
of the Security Council, Annexes I-II, U.N. Doc. S/2004/420 (May 24, 2004). These
reports are collected at ICTY, Reports and Publications: Completion Strategy,
http://www.icty.org/tabs/14/2 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
17. See Raab, supra note 4, at 86 (reaching conclusion on the basis of October 2003
reports). This prediction continues to be borne out by the latest assessments of the
president and prosecutor. See Report of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugosolavia, provided to the Security Council Under Paragraph 6 of
Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004), ¶ 7, Letter Dated 12 November 2009, supra note
16, Annex II (predicting that appeals would continue to be processed through 2013).
18. STEVEN D. ROPER & LILIAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
71–72 (2006).
19. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 9, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192
(qualifying the concept of concurrent jurisdiction with the Tribunal’s primacy); see also
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, ¶ 64, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (“[N]ational courts should be encouraged to exercise their
jurisdiction in accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures . . . .”);
Letter dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 134–36, U.N. Doc. S/25266
(Feb. 10, 1993) (report of the Commission of the French Jurists entrusted to study the
creation of a criminal Tribunal for the adjudication of the crimes committed in the
territory of the Former Yugoslavia and reproduced as a document of the Security
Council). For an updated copy of the statute that consolidates all subsequent
amendments, none of which affect article 9, see ICTY, Updated Statute of the International
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Strengthening national legal orders should have been key to the
operation of the ICTY from the beginning.20
Rule 11 bis proceedings are the latest in a range of actions
aiming to bolster national fora. Previous attempts included the
“Outreach Programme” established by Judge McDonald in
199921 and the “Rules of the Road” initiative.22 These initiatives,
although not hugely successful,23 paved the way for the adoption
of Rule 11 bis. Rule 11 bis was formally adopted by the Tribunal
on November 12, 1997.24

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.icty.org/
x/file/legal%20library/statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
20. Rule 11 bis has been particularly helpful not only in rehabilitating and
improving national judicial systems in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but also by encouraging the flow of evidence and other materials from an
international to a national level, which has in turn stimulated the development of these
legal systems to a point where the Tribunal is no longer necessary. See David Tolbert &
Aleksander Kontic, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to National Courts, and Lessons for the ICC, in THE
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 135, 136–37 (Carsten
Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009).
21. See Lal C. Vohrah & Jon Cina, The Outreach Programme, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 547 (Richard
May et al., eds, 2001) (analyzing the Outreach Programme).
22. The parties to the Dayton Agreement resolved in Rome on February 18, 1996
that “persons other than those already indicted by the Tribunal may be arrested and
detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a
previously issued order, warrant of indictment that had been reviewed and deemed
consistent with international legal standards by the Tribunal.” President of the ICTY,
Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 135, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. S/1999/846, A/54/187 (Aug. 2, 1999); see also Graham T. Blewitt, The International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 145, 150–51 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
23. See David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 14–15
(2002).
24. See Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 2 (May 17, 2005); see also President of the ICTY, Fifth Annual
Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 105, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. S/1998/737, A/53/219 (Aug. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Fifth Annual Report of the
ICTY] (noting the adoption of Rule 11 bis on November 12, 1997, at the conclusion of
the fourteenth plenary session of the Tribunal).
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Introduction to Rule 11 bis

“Referral” and “deferral” are terms used extensively in
international criminal law. They both denote the transfer of
jurisdiction from one level to another.25 More specifically,
deferrals refer to the transfer of a case from national courts for
the purposes of trial at the international level, whereas referrals
describe the reverse.26 Deferrals are explicitly mentioned in the
ICTY Statute and the RPE,27 but the term referral is only found in
Rule 11 bis of the RPE.28 Another type of referral constitutes a
trigger mechanism for the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) under the ICC’s Rome Statute.29 Despite
the common spelling, ICC referrals draw a sharp contrast to
ICTY referrals in that they do not bestow competence on the
Tribunal and more broadly cover a “situation,” rather than a
specific indictee.30
The body entrusted with ICTY referrals is the referral bench.
This quasi chamber within the tribunal is responsible for
25. Referral is defined as the act of sending to another for consideration or
decision. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1394 (9th ed. 2009); see also OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1213 (Joyce M. Hawkins & Robert Allen eds., 1991) (defining
“refer” as to send or direct a person or question for decision). Defer, on the other hand,
is defined as the act of yielding to another authority. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at
486; see also OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 378 (defining
“defer” as to yield or make concessions in opinion or action).
26. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 9; ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis; see also
Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis: Partly Confidential (Attached Schedules to
Annex I Filed Confidential), ¶ 7, Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 2,
2004) (discussing the purpose of a referral).
27. E.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 9(2); ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 9–11.
28. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis.
29. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13(b), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Security Council, for instance, referred
the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the International Criminal Court following this trigger
mechanism. See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). Other
trigger mechanisms include the proprio motu initiation of investigations by the prosecutor
or state parties referrals, such as the situation in the Central African Republic, Press
Release, Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central
African Republic, No. ICC-OTP 20050107-86 (Jan. 7, 2005), the situation Democratic
Republic of Congo, Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, No. ICC-OTP-20040419-50 (Apr. 19, 2004), and the
situation in the Republic of Uganda, Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda Refers
Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, No. ICC-2004012944 (Jan. 29, 2004), the three other situations currently under investigation. See Rome
Statute, supra, arts. 13, 15.
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 13(b).
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determining the suitability of an indictment for referral.31 It
consists of three judges specially appointed by the Tribunal’s
president and has the power to order referrals either on its own
accord or on the basis of a request by the prosecutor.32
The referral bench shares many of the characteristics of a
chamber. It too consists of three judges that have, to date, always
been the same33 and operates with reference to the ICTY Statute
and the RPE.34 Unlike a chamber, the three judges are not
assigned to the bench at all times; instead, membership is
determined by the Tribunal’s president on the basis of the cases
to be heard.35 Importantly, the bench also differs from a chamber
in that it does not decide cases in their substance.36 The bench is
limited to deciding whether certain indictments will be
transferred to national courts for trial without instructing the
latter on how to proceed with the case.37
Despite the fact that the bench may only review certain
aspects of the indictment in its referral decision, such decisions
are not administrative in nature. Finding a suitable forum for
trial is an important judicial function. Its equivalent in the ICC
would be the determination on complementarity, and the
pretrial chamber’s decision on whether the case will remain with
a national court or whether it will be tried in The Hague.38 In
Rule 11 bis, the Tribunal seeks to establish whether to send an
indictment back to national courts rather than continue with the
trial internationally, rendering Rule 11 bis the reverse process of
ICC complementarity.

31. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A).
32. See id. R. 11 bis(B).
33. See William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of
the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 326–27 (2008)
(identifying the three judges as Alphons Orie, O-Gon Kwon, and Kevin Parker).
34. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(H) (equating the bench with a chamber
in terms of its powers and obligation to follow procedures under the RPE, “insofar as
applicable”).
35. See id. R. 11 bis(A).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 18; see also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani,
Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism of the International Criminal Court, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN
BOS 57, 70–71 (Herman von Hebel et al. eds., 1999).
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The ICTY Statute39 makes no reference to a referral bench.
As the bench is only envisaged in Rule 11 bis of the RPE40 its
legality has been challenged.41 In the Stanković appeals decision,
the defense, on its first ground of appeal, questioned the power
of the bench to refer a case on the basis that “Rule 11bis lacks a
legal basis in the statute and in any implied or inherent powers
that the Tribunal may have.”42 The defense argued further that
“[t]he [United Nations (“U.N.”)] Security Council’s stated
support for the completion strategy is not enough . . . to create a
legal basis for transferring cases out of the Tribunal’s’
jurisdiction,”43 nor does any provision of the statute provide a
legal basis for the adoption of Rule 11 bis.44 The establishment of
the ICTY by Security Council resolutions means that certain
aspects of its existence depend on the political will of its parent
body. The Tribunal enjoys significant autonomy in its everyday
operation.45 Security Council resolutions, nevertheless,
39. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19. The statute may only be amended by Security
Council resolution. Since its adoption in 1993, the Statute for the International Tribunal
(“ICTY Statute”) has been amended ten times, most recently on the July 7, 2009. See S.C.
Res. 1877, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009). Amendments included, among others,
the creation of an additional trial chamber and the appointment of ad litem judges. See
S.C. Res. 1660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1660 (Feb. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1329 (Dec. 5, 2000).
40. The text of the original ICTY Statute empowered the judges of the Tribunal to
adopt a set of rules of procedure and evidence. Statute of the International Tribunal,
supra note 19, art. 15. Implicit in the power to create these rules is the power to amend
them. See Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedure for International Criminal Law?
The Rules of the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW
OF THE ICTY 1, 4 (Gideon Boas & William Schabas eds., 2003). When the rules were first
adopted they contained a provision that governed their subsequent amendment. See
ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 6. Thus, the RPE are judge-made and subject to frequent
amendments to meet the Tribunal’s changing needs. The RPE have been revised fortyfour times since they were first adopted. See ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
http://www.icty.org/sid/136 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
41. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on
Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶¶ 10–17 (Sept. 1, 2005) (denying a Rule 11 bis appeal and
allowing, in part, the prosecutor’s appeal).
42. Id. ¶ 10.
43. Id. ¶ 11.
44. Id.
45. Perhaps the most disputable incident, which is viewed by some as the product
of Security Council intervention, is the decision to refrain from prosecution in the case
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bombing. For an analysis of the decision, see
generally Michael Cottier, What Relationship Between the Exercise of Universal and Territorial
Jurisdiction? The Decision of 13 December 2000 of the Spanish National Court Shelving the
Proceedings Against Guatemalan Nationals Accused of Genocide, in INTERNATIONAL AND
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determine the Tribunal’s life span, as well as the strategy leading
to the termination of its function.46 The ICTY has therefore
enjoyed the freedom of undertaking those actions necessary for
its effective functioning.47 Whether the establishment and
operation of a referral bench falls within these so called inherent
powers of the Tribunal is debatable.
The referral bench rejected the appellant’s arguments in
Stankovic and based its analysis on the Tribunal’s concurrent
jurisdiction, thereby opting not to elaborate on the inherent
powers doctrine.48 The concurrent, as opposed to exclusive,
jurisdiction is good enough indication for the bench that a
certain role is envisaged for alternative national jurisdictions.49
Notwithstanding the concurrent nature of the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction, the preceding argument is not entirely convincing.
Although the role reserved for national courts should not be
disregarded, concurrent jurisdiction, as found in article 9(1) of
the ICTY Statute, does not provide the requisite authority for
setting up a system to transfer cases to domestic courts. Rather,
concurrent jurisdiction was chosen to highlight that the Tribunal
is not intended to replace or displace national courts50 and,
through deferral, enable trial of the most important cases at the
international level. Rule 11 bis does not facially negate the
Tribunal’s concurrent jurisdiction because it does not remove
each and every case from the Tribunal for trial by a national
court. Together with deferrals, Rule 11 bis constitutes a further
mechanism for allocating cases between the national and the
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS 843 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001).
46. See JEAN-PIERRE COT & ALAIN PELLET, LA CHARTRE DES NATIONS UNIES 216 (2d
ed. 1991) (Fr.) (“Les conditions de suppression d’un organe subsidiaire sont symétriques des
conditions de création: la suppression résulte d’une manifestation de volonté de l’organe principal
créateur.”).
47. See generally Paola Gaeta, Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, in
MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO
CASSESE 353 (Lal C. Vohrah et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the Tribunal’s inherent
powers).
48. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 14; cf. Rocío Digón, Recent
Developments, The Stankovic Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 283–84 (2006) (noting the impact of the Tadić
decision on the Stanković appeal).
49. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 14 (“[I]t is clear that alternative
national jurisdictions have consistently been contemplated for ‘transfer’ of accused.”).
50. See supra note 19.
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international spheres. Be that as it may, reference to the latter as
the sole legal basis for referrals is misconstrued, given that they
are not explicitly mentioned in article 9 of the ICTY Statute,
which revolves solely around deferrals.51
Additional legal basis for referrals may be found in Security
Council Resolution 1503, which explicitly endorses the
completion strategy adopted by the Tribunal, an integral part of
which is the transfer of indictments to national courts.52 This
resolution, though not explicitly referring to Rule 11 bis,
indirectly approves of the chosen method. Nevertheless, it fails to
explain why the Security Council declined a statute amendment
to explicitly provide for referrals.53 Given that the Tribunal had
to find a way to lighten its workload and that no amendment of
the statute was forthcoming, the only other available method to
achieve this was by amending the RPE, which can be
accomplished by the judges alone.54 This approach is partially
successful. Although no other option was practical, an RPE
amendment of this kind stumbles upon the statute itself.55 Article
15 of the ICTY Statute lists the specific reasons for which rules
may only be adopted.56 To benefit from this provision, referrals
would have to be construed as “conduct of the pre-trial phase of
the proceedings.”57 The decision as to the appropriate forum for
subsequent trial may technically belong to a phase prior to trial,
but it does not cover the pretrial phase stricto sensu, which in the
ICTY is concluded with the review of the indictment58 and which,
has yet to take place before national courts. Given that article 15
does not contain a definition of what acts would fall within the
pretrial phase, a literal interpretation of this provision may be

51. See Susan Somers, Rule 11bis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: Referral of Indictments to National Courts, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 175,
176 (2007) (arguing that referrals are a “[r]etreat from [p]rimacy”).
52. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1, 7.
53. See Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 11.
54. See supra text accompanying note 40.
55. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 11 (referring to article 9 and 29 in
the context of Tribunal jurisdiction).
56. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 15 (“The judges of the International
Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial
phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection
of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.”).
57. Id.
58. Id. art. 19.
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accepted. In practice, had the Security Council’s objected to the
inclusion of Rule 11 bis in the RPE, it could have intervened by
specifically adopting a resolution amending the statute to the
opposite effect or by prohibiting such transfers. Given the
Security Council’s acquiescence, it is beyond doubt that the
Security Council agrees with the path chosen by the Tribunal’s
judges. Nevertheless, a statute amendment explicitly providing
for referrals would have been preferable to the ad hoc solution
reached and would have eliminated challenges to its legality by
putative transferees.
By referring to the resolution outlining the Tribunal’s
completion strategy, ample authority may be discerned for the
creation of the referral bench, justification of its operation, and
subsequent analysis of its practice.
C. The Referral Process
The bench is not obliged to, but “may,” order a referral.59
More specifically, the bench may refer cases only after being
satisfied that “the accused with receive a fair trial and that the
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”60 Referral
decisions are therefore evaluated on the basis of whether the
bench exercised its discretion correctly based on the criteria set
out in Rule 11 bis.61
Of the possible cases that may be considered for referral,
there are those that have been investigated to different degrees
by the prosecutor but did not result in an indictment62 and those
that, although they have been investigated and indictments
against named suspects have been issued, may be subsequently
referred to national courts for trial. It is the latter category that is
the focus of this Article.

59. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A); see also Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case
No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 10 (Apr. 7, 2006) (discussing the discretion of the referral bench in
issuing orders).
60. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B).
61. Mejakić, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 10.
62. See id. art. 18 (governing indictments). In the context of referrals, see Press
Release, ICTY, Radovan Stankovic Transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
CT/MO/1008e (Sept. 29, 2005).
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Despite the reference to “authorities of a State,”63 national
jurisdictions have generally played a limited role. In Rule 11 bis,
state involvement in the decision to refer is limited to
representations states are invited to make before the referral
bench.64 These are mainly for the purpose of satisfying the bench
that the accused will receive a fair trial before the national courts
considered for referral and that the death penalty will not be
imposed.65 However, once the referral is upheld, the trial itself
will be conducted exclusively before national courts, which have
sole responsibility for determining the innocence or guilt of the
accused.66
Rule 11 bis contains a series of hurdles that must be
overcome in order for trial to take place at the national level.
The most important of those is gravity: unless the crimes and the
responsibility of the accused involve lower or intermediate
indictees, the Tribunal cannot seek an appropriate state to
receive the indictment. Subsequently, the referral bench
examines the applicable substantive law likely to be used by a
state upon referral, as well as issues relating to sentencing and
fair trial.67
1. Gravity
A judicial examination into the gravity of a case has become
increasingly important in international criminal law. The concept
finds express use in the ICC Statute with regard to the
admissibility of a case.68 In the ICTY, however, the emphasis on
63. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A); see also Mejakić, Decision on Joint
Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 10 (Apr. 7, 2006)
(discussing the discretion of the referral bench in issuing orders).
64. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B).
65. See id.
66. See id. R. 11 bis(D).
67. See generally ICTY & the U.N. Interregional Crime & Justice Research Inst.,
ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, at 168–70 (May 28, 2009), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/about/reports%20and%20publications/
manual_developed_practices/icty_manual_on_developed_practices.pdf
(discussing
criteria for referral, monitoring, and other post-referral issues).
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 17(1)(d) (providing that the case shall be
determined inadmissible where “the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court”); see also Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01-04-01/06-8-Corr,
Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber Is Decision of 10 February 2006 and the
Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, ¶¶ 42–75 (Feb. 24, 2006).
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gravity is rather recent.69 The focus of the Tribunal was not
necessarily on more senior perpetrators from the outset. Even if a
“pyramidal strategy”70 were followed, perpetrators like Duško
Tadić, the Tribunal’s first accused,71 were tried in The Hague
largely because the ICTY did not have many persons present for
trial at the time.72 The Tribunal also dealt with accused who
would now be classified as “small fr[ies]” later in its operation
due to many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)
Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“SFOR”)
arrests.73
Gravity is an integral part of referral determinations under
Rule 11 bis. As a result, it has been contested by both the defense
and the prosecutorial sides trying to either prevent or acheive a
referral.74 Unlike domestic criminal proceedings where the
accused tend to downplay higher gravity, indictees facing a Rule
69. Despite various references to gravity, the Tribunal established its criteria for its
adjudication in Rule 11 bis case law. See The Secretary-General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶¶ 64–65,
U.N. Doc. S/25704, ¶ 28 (May 3, 1993). Moreover, the President of the Security Council
stated on July 23, 2002, that the Council “recognized” that the ICTY should be
concentrating on those leaders most responsible in the war and “endorse[d] the . . .
broad strategy for the transfer of cases involving intermediary and lower-level accused to
competent national jurisdictions.” See Press Release, Security Council, Statement by the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/21 (July 23, 2002); see also
Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L.F. 281, 296
(2006); William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International
Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CT. JUST. 731, 746 (2008).
70. Antonio Cassese, The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 585,
586–88 (2004); see also Nicola Piacente, Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine
for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 446, 447–48 (2004).
71. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶¶ 6, 9
(May 7, 1997) (noting that Tadić was arrested by the German police in Munich on
February 13, 1994, and transferred to the ICTY on April 24, 1995).
72. See José E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 2031, 2093 (1998) (agreeing with the piecemeal approach on the basis that the
prosecutor is able to “work out kinks while the stakes [were] not perceived to be as
high,” and to “build a pyramid of factual evidence that ultimately leads upward to
higher-level officials”).
73. At one time, accused were arriving in the Hague at the rate of one per month.
See Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of
Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 87, 87 (2001).
74. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15–16 (July 25, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-0265-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶
16–17 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15–16 (May 17, 2005).
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11 bis referral have in practice mostly argued in favour of higher
gravity so as to receive trial internationally.75 There are a number
of potential explanations for this, ranging from trust in the
international criminal Tribunal (or rather distrust in national
courts by certain indictees),76 a sense of pride, but more likely,
the possibility of receiving more lenient sentences, if tried in The
Hague.
Rule 11 bis(C), which covers gravity, expressly refers to
Security Council Resolution 1534.77 The rule endorses the
obligation found in operative paragraph five of the resolution to
“concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”
and provides the mechanism for its implementation.78 The rule is
not the only safeguard against trying lower level perpetrators in
The Hague. A more potent provision is rule 28(A) of the RPE
which subjects the prosecutorial efforts to a form of judicial
trusteeship.79

75. See Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 16; Mejakić,
Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 17;
Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 16.
76. These objections were put forward mainly by Bosnian Serbs whose indictments
were referred to the Bosnian State Court. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 50, 52, 54, 56–57, 59; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 23, 53, 79. It is doubtful whether they would have had the same
reaction if they were referred to Serbian courts instead. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 23, 53, 79. This may be seen from the written motions of Serbian nations
before the Bosnian State Court. They all displayed varying degrees of disrespect to the
court, ranging from references to “Jamahiriya Bosnia and Herzegovina” the “so called
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” to claiming no understanding of the language of the
court, and refusing to be present during hearings. See, e.g., Fonz za humanitarno pravo
[Humanitarian Law Center], Slučaj "Kravica" Mitrović i dr. [Case of “Kravitz” Mitrović et
al.],
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/PravdaIReforma/Sudjenje-za-ratne-zlocine/
SudjenjaZaRatne-Nacionalna-sudjenja-za-ratne-zlocine/Sudjenje-za-ratne-nacionalnaBiH/149.sr.html (Serb.). It may not be that these indictees placed any trust in the ICTY,
but they definitely objected to being tried by Bosnian authorities. Cf. Prosecutor v.
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the
Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20, (Sept. 14, 2005) (recognizing that
Norac and Ademi were perceived by a great number of Croats as national heroes and
did not object to the referral).
77. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C).
78. See S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 4, ¶ 5; see also S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 4, ¶ 8.
79. See Raab, supra note 4, at 90; Johnson, supra note 4, at 164–66; Mundis, supra
note 4, at 606, 612. A discussion of this provision is, however, beyond the scope of this
Article.
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Pursuant to Rule 11 bis the bench seeks to refer indictments
that are “not ipso facto incompatible with referral[s].”80 If the
alleged crimes are not so grave as to demand international trial,81
they would be equally suitable for trial by either the Tribunal or
national courts.82 The threshold is consistent with the bench’s
view on concurrent jurisdiction, where Rule 11 bis is seen as a
mechanism
for
distinguishing
amongst
“alternative”
83
jurisdictions. At no point is it indicated that the indictments
selected for referral should not have been prepared at the
international level in the first place. Cases examined for referral
differ from those that would be tried ab initio before national
courts, or those which, despite having been investigated
internationally, did not result in indictments at the Tribunal. The
seriousness of referral cases, although acknowledged, does not
suffice to retain them for trial at the Tribunal.
2. The Elements: Gravity of Crimes and Level of Responsibility
Rule 11 bis(C) specifically directs a court to consider gravity
in determining whether to refer an indictment to a national
court.84 Provided that the gravity of the crimes is low and the
accused holds limited responsibility, the indictment is suitable for
referral.85
The first element contained in Rule 11 bis(C) requires that
the charged crimes be of sufficient gravity in order to warrant
referral.86 However, the rule is silent on how gravity is

80. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on
Rule 11 bis Referral, at 7 n.14 (May 17, 2005); Janković, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20.
81. See Prosecution’s Further Submission Pursuant to Chamber’s Decision of 14
April 2005, ¶ 2, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT (Apr. 28,
2005); see also Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 15.
82. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 18 (July 8, 2005) (acknowledging that certain cases are
better placed before an international forum whereas others “would also be suitable for
prosecution before a competent national court”). The case is therefore suitable for trial
either by the Tribunal or by national courts. Id.
83. See id.
84. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C) (citing S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 4).
85. Id. Interestingly, the prosecutor in the trial of Norac and Ademi requested
referral on the basis of a single criterion. See Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11
bis, ¶ 9, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT (Sept. 2, 2004).
86. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C).

BEKOU_K-FINAL

740

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

determined so the threshold applicable to this inquiry is left to
the determination of the bench.87
Despite lacking an established hierarchy of crimes in the
statute or rules, the Tribunal’s case law has long accepted that
certain crimes are graver than others.88 Each of the crimes falling
within the jurisdiction of the ICTY has the potential to be grave,
depending on the circumstances. Indeed, the sentencing scheme
contained in the statute does not carry different sentences for
different crimes.89 The specific crimes committed are of interest,
not necessarily the type of crimes. Even though gravity is
examined on an individualed basis, the submission of evidence is
not contemplated in the course of the referral hearing.90 This
may be explained by the nature of the process and the fact that
the trial will follow. However, failing to examine evidence can be
detrimental to the defense, which may be less able to rebut the
prosecutorial assessment on gravity. A detailed examination into
the commission of the alleged crimes would guarantee a better
insight into their gravity and therefore facilitate the bench’s
determination. While the current approach may be efficient, it is
by no means thorough. On the other hand, entering deeper into
the presentation of evidence that by no means enters into the
merits of the case could infringe the accused’s presumption of
innocence, because determinations of the international tribunal
would presumably have significant weight during the trial before
national courts.
In setting the standards for gravity, other cases may be of
assistance to ensure that the right indictments are referred to
national courts. Previous judgments pronounced by the Tribunal
87. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis.
88. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment, ¶ 16
(Sept. 4, 1998) (describing genocide as “the crime of crimes”); see also Ademi & Norac,
Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11
bis, ¶ 21 (Sept. 14, 2005) (paraphrasing the government of Croatia as stating that crimes
against humanity and war crimes “form the lower levels of the hierarchy of the crimes
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction”).
89. See Ademi & Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of
Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20 (referring to the argument advanced by defense
counsel that there is no “differentiated span of sentences” in the Statute); see also
Olaoluwa Olusanya, Do Crimes Against Humanity Deserve a Higher Sentence than War
Crimes?, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (discussing the need to apply
differentiated sentences for different crimes).
90. See, e.g., Ademi & Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic
of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20.
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are not precedents as sources of law, but do serve as tools of
interpretation.91 Even so, should the bench consider cases
already tried by the Tribunal? Should the bench consider cases
relating to indictments already referred or those which are being
considered for referral? Or, should cases be selected using some
temporal element? For instance, are 1997, when Rule 11 bis was
inserted into the RPE,92 or even 2003–2004, when the completion
strategy was adopted,93 critical dates?
In the Norac case, the bench accepted that it is “impossible
to measure the gravity of any crime in isolation” and, apart from
the circumstances of a crime, gravity “must also be viewed in the
context of other cases tried by [the] Tribunal.”94 The bench did
not, however, specify which other cases it was prepared to
consider. Several attempts have been lodged by defense counsel
in order to compare their position with previous cases tried
before the ICTY and, more specifically, other referral cases. In
the Stanković referral, for instance, the defense argued that
Vuković in the Kunarac case was tried by the ICTY despite being
charged with crimes of “much lesser scope” than the case at
hand.95 The defense for Todović argued that the crimes charged
are ‘“quite serious” and “more grave” than the offenses charged
in other trials that commenced after the relevant Security Council
resolutions endorsing the Tribunal’s completion strategy.96 In the
Janković appeal the appellant cited both cases tried by the ICTY
and cases where referral was considered in an effort to convince
the panel to retain the case.97 The appeals chamber correctly
rejected the submission that it was obliged to consider other

91. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11
bis Referral, ¶ 26 (Nov. 15, 2005).
92. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 4.
94. Ademi & Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of
Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 28.
95. Transcript of Record at 212, Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT
(Mar. 4, 2005).
96. Savo Todovic’s Defence Response to the Prosecution’s 11 bis Motion and
Defence’s Submission of Further Information in Accordance with the Referral Bench’s
Decision of 14 April 2005 and in the Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11
bis, ¶ 23, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT (Apr. 28, 2005).
97. Defence Appellant’s Brief, ¶¶ 33–35, Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-9623/2-AR11bis.2 (Aug. 23, 2005) (referring to the cases of Halilović, Knezevic, Kovačevič,
Stakić, and Stanković).
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cases as a matter of law.98 The possibility, however, that the bench
should be “guided by a comparison with an indictment in
another case” was not dismissed.99 Nevertheless, the bench did
not clarify which other cases were eligible.
The prosecution has also tried using other cases in support
of their position. In the case of Dragomir Milošević the
prosecutor conceded the gravity of the alleged crimes but
unsuccessfully argued that the alleged crimes, albeit serious, were
already tried before the ICTY in another case and the
“contribution to the historical record of the events would be
reduced in importance.”100 Even though Rule 11 bis did not
include whether a conduct had been “sufficiently tried” in
another case—or even whether the historical facts surrounding
the conduct were well documented—among its criteria,101
reliance on other cases in the future was left open. First, the
bench mentioned that the Galić case, to which the prosecutor
referred, was on appeal.102 The relevance of this fact was not
discussed any further but it was indicative that the bench would
probably have considered the outcome of the appeal if a decision
were rendered. Second, the judges moved on to state that the
conduct in Milošević, relative to Galić, covered two distinct periods

98. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 26 (Nov. 15, 2005).
99. Id.
100. See Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, and III, , ¶
22, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT (Jan. 31, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v.
Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment (Dec. 5, 2003)). This argument might have some
merit had the sole purpose of the ICTY were the establishment of an accurate historical
record. As is, for instance, the general purpose of a truth and reconciliation
commission. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Accomodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and
National Reconciliation: The U.N. Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 952,
954 (2001); G. G. J. Knoops, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Models and
International Tribunals: a Comparison (Sept. 29–Oct. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.unpo.org/downloads/ProfKnoops.pdf. For a more elaborate description on
the function served by a truth and reconciliation commission, see Jamie L. Wacks, A
Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the United States Through Personal
Stories, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 195, 204–207 (2000). While international trial may
contribute to that cause, their function extends beyond compiling a record of crimes,
not least because they determine a person’s guilt or innocence. See José E. Alvarez,
Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 375, 382
(1999); Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned From ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427,
428 (2004).
101. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 20 (July 8,
2005).
102. See id.
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in time and were therefore not “fully addressed.”103 The decision
stressed how the case at hand differed from Galić rather than
emphasise that the latter would not have had an impact on the
former’s outcome anyway.104 This is due to the higher gravity,
which was also conceded by the prosecutor and not dependent
upon whether the facts surrounding conduct were fully
addressed in another case. The confusing approach adopted by
the bench is unfortunate because it will not preclude similar
arguments from being raised in other cases.
There is yet another reason why the inclusion of the
criterion whether a conduct was sufficiently tried is unacceptable.
As noted above, once the indictment is referred to the national
courts, they have sole responsibility and freedom to determine all
the facts surrounding the case, thus establishing its own
“historical record.”105 If the case would be referred on the
grounds that these findings were already well established by the
Tribunal in previous cases, national courts would be practically
bound to implement those findings in their prospective
judgments. Although national courts certainly can rely on these
findings, their obligation to do so would seriously impact their
independence.
The discussion illustrates that the referral bench does not
have a clear view on the input that other cases may have on
referral decisions. Although each indictment is examined within
the context of its own facts, the chamber should set the criteria
that it is willing to apply more concretely. Parity among
indictments selected for referral would help create a level playing
field and assist the Tribunal in setting the threshold at the
desired level so that indictments eligible for referral are
identified and dealt with at the appropriate jurisdictional level.
Previous cases tried by the Tribunal are useful to the extent that

103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Besides the fact that any other solution would infringe the principle of
independence of national judiciary this position can be inferred from the fact that the
chamber did not want to discuss any issues that could irrevocably determine the conduct
of the national courts. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 46 (May 17, 2005) (discussing the
applicable law). However, it could be argued that the freedom and responsibility to
determine facts are to some extent infringed by the provisions of the Rule 11 bis(D)(iii),
(iv) and (F).

BEKOU_K-FINAL

744

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

they highlight higher gravity in order to make the distinction
with “lower” indictees clearer. Inserting a temporal element to
distinguish amongst cases would not have assisted much, as
neither the adoption of Rule 11 bis nor the completion strategy
impact the jurisdictional question. What changes is the forum for
trial for a certain number of cases, which is in line with the
Tribunal’s view on concurrent jurisdiction.
Besides considering other cases, the bench has employed
two quantitative standards to determine gravity.106 If the alleged
crimes do not cover a wide area and are limited in duration, then
an indictment is likely to be suitable for referral.107 When
contrasted with Galić, which the prosecution argued involved “a
pervasive and continuous campaign of shelling and sniping
conducted at a large scale on an almost daily basis over many
months,”108 it becomes evident why the case against Dragomir
Milošević was tried by the ICTY. The bench’s approach does not
take account of the particular facts and participation of the
alleged perpetrator in the commission of the crimes in
question.109 Although this is in line with examining the conflict as
a whole, it does not necessarily assist in defining the gravity of the
specific crimes. Gravity of the crimes is examined almost
mechanically, based on the factual situation on the ground. To
add to this surgical approach, the number of victims is taken into
account: the larger the number, the higher the gravity of the
crime.110 Conversely, a small or limited number of victims is
106. See Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral
to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 22, (Sept. 14,
2005); see also Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 21
(July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes 1 and II, ¶ 23 (July 8,
2005) (mentioning that the defendants were committed as part of a joint criminal
enterprise but failing to elaborate); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (May 17, 2005).
107. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19; Janković,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19.
108. Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, and III, ¶ 20,
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT (Jan. 31, 2005) (citing Prosecutor v.
Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 764 (Dec. 5, 2003)).
109. To a certain extent, this aspect can be covered by examining the role of the
accused.
110. Compare Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis
with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 23 (noting that the number of victims was large),
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indicative of lower gravity.111 The bench has never proceeded
with an evaluation of defense arguments when the numbers of
victims was contested.112 Nor has it proactively determined these
numbers though a fact-finding process;113 in effect, displaying
“blind trust” towards the prosecutorial assessments. Similarly,
attempts to consider some qualitative elements in the assessment
of gravity, such as the civilian status of the victims or the close
range of killing and destruction, have left the bench
unperturbed.114
The consideration of geographic, temporal, or numerical
factors reveals an attempt to insert some objectivity in the
decision-making process. This attempt is only partially successful.
Undoubtedly, these factors assist in quantifying the gravity of the
crimes. However, a strict application of the above elements is
bereft of an evaluative approach. A case, despite its limited
geographic scope, temporal duration, or low number of victims,
may still fulfill the criteria for deferral under Rule 9(iii), if it
serves the interests of justice.115 This, in turn, would render the
case unsuitable for referral, and would call for trial at the
Tribunal.116 However unlikely this may be at this late stage of the
Tribunal’s operation, the ICTY should be open to consider such
cases, in line with the statute and RPE. While the use of set
with Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (characterizing
offenses committed against sixteen victims as “limited in scope”).
111. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19. This
precise argument was advanced by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
Stanković referral. See Response by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to
Questions Posed by the Specially Appointed Chamber in Its Decision for Further
Information in the Context of the Proecutor’s Request Under Rule 11 bis of 9 February
2005 at 1, Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT (Feb. 24, 2005).
112. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on
Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 17 (Nov. 15, 2005) (arguing on appeal that the Bench only
considered the crimes alleged in the indictment to the exclusion of “thousands” of
others).
113. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 18 (considering only the
facts alleged in the indictment); Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 22 (same); Stanković, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 18 (May 17, 2005) (same).
114. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for
Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (Sept.
14, 2005).
115. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 9(iii) (allowing deferral if “what is in issue is
closely related to, or otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions which may
have implications for investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal”).
116. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 10(C).

BEKOU_K-FINAL

746

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

criteria is welcome, a more inquisitive evaluation of the gravity of
crimes should be encouraged.
The second element in Rule 11 bis(C) covers the level of
responsibility of the accused.117 This is determined by reference
to the role of the defendant in the commission of the alleged
offenses in tandem with their position in the civil or military
hierarchy.118 In numerous court orders by the referral bench, the
bench invited briefing on whether the role of the accused and his
position and rank were to be taken conjunctively or whether they
were alternatives.119 If taken together, the threshold would be
higher than if the two factors were deemed to be alternatives.
The bench in Norac determined that both elements should be
examined together.120 Albeit stricter, this approach allows for a
clearer determination of the role and position of the accused,
providing a more accurate picture on gravity.
Drawing the outer limits of senior responsibility is not an
easy task. Nor is distinguishing between the “most senior leaders”
and their “lower” counterparts. Although most would agree that
persons beyond the architects of an “overall policy”121 would also
be classed as leaders, it is difficult to decide where to precisely
draw the circle of leadership. When determining whether their
117. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(C) (requiring consideration of “the level
of responsibility of the accused”).
118. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19; Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case
No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision for Further Information in the Context of the Prosecutor’s
Motion Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (Sept. 5, 2005); Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral
of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes 1 and II, ¶ 23; Stanković, Decision
on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19.
119. E.g., Ljubičić, Decision for Further Information in the Context of the
Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis, at 2; Janković, Decision for Further Information
in the Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis, at 4 (Apr. 15, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-OR-65-PT, Decision for Further Information in the
Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision for Further Information in the Context of
the Prosecutor’s Request Under Rule 11 bis, at 3 (Feb. 9, 2005).
120. Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to
the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 31 (Sept. 14, 2005)
(concluding that despite their status as commanding officers, referral of the accused was
“not ipso facto incompatible with . . . Rule 11bis(A)”); see also Prosecutor v. Lukić &
Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-AR11bis.1, Decision on Milan Lukić’s Appeal Regarding
Referral, ¶¶ 25–26 (July 11, 2007) (emphasizing the more subjective element of actual
role over the accused’s relatively low military rank given his active role in organising
especially deadly paramilitary attacks).
121. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 22 (July 8, 2005).
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actual role and formal position merits international attention,
each accused is considered separately by the bench. Some cases
have been harder than others to decide. For instance, the
position of Radovan Stanković as an infantry soldier facilitated
the finding that he was not a leader in the context of Security
Council Resolution 1503.122 By contrast, the bench in the Rašević
and Todović referral refused to classify the two accused as
leaders,123 and rejected the argument that the second-incommand should be tried by the ICTY if the first-in-command is
as well.124 The bench’s rationale in reaching this conclusion is
not evidently clear given the brevity of the court on this point.
Due emphasis is placed on the political role the accused
possessed.125 The political role of an accused can distinguish a
leader from other indictees.126 The Tribunal differentiates
between planners and actors that execute the will of the
planners.127 For a person to be considered a leader, they must
hold some political role that elevates them above the other
perpetrators.128 This informal element gains importance and
establishes a safer mechanism for measuring individual
responsibility because increased planning capability constitutes
evidence of greater gravity. This element is well-thought-out and
satisfactorily applied.
The responsibility of the accused is judged ratione loci within
the context of a specific territory, but the bench has not been
consistent in its approach on locality. For instance, in Janković the
bench did not render the accused a leader under Rule 11 bis

122. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15,19.
123. See Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 23.
124. See id. ¶ 19.
125. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule
11 bis Referral, ¶ 19 (Nov. 15, 2005) (emphasizing that “[n]othing in the wording of
11bis(C) indicates that the ‘level of responsibility’ is restricted to military responsibility to
the exclusion of political responsibility” (emphasis added)). The appeals chamber went
on to support this conclusion with reference to Security Council Resolution 1534, supra
note 4. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19.
126. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19 (ordering referral, despite
the sub-commander position held by Janković, because he lacked a political role).
127. See Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 26,
31 (Dec. 17, 2004).
128. See Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (May 17, 2005).
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even though he held local command.129 But in the Milošević
referral it resisted the prosecutor’s argument that Milošević was
an “intermediate and lower-level accused”130 given his
subservience to Mladić and Karadžić within the Army of the
Republika Srpska.131 Instead, the bench relied on Milošević’s very
senior role within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a specialized unit
of the Bosnian Serb Army.132 Unfortunatley, the Tribunal again
did not take this opportunity to explain whether criminal
responsibility should be measured against a particular area where
the accused operated or whether the territory of the former
Yugoslavia as a whole must be examined.133 The bench seems
prepared to limit the inquiry to the local level, but, at the same
time, did not specifically delimit the boundaries of the relevant
territory.134 This is understandable given that each case is
examined on its own merits.135 An a priori determination of
relevant territories would provide a basis for exclusion of certain
cases from the referral process. The localization of responsibility
in a specific territory is a good indication of gravity and is
supported by the evidence that is available to the bench.
The nature of a particular activity, both in terms of its
duration and substance, also bears on the true role played by an
accused. An activity carried out over a limited period of time
entails the risk that it may not be representative of the actual
level of responsibility. The performance of a given role must
extend over a substantial period of time in order to classify the
accused as a leader.136 In addition, the degree of the activity
weighs on the assessment of responsibility. That the accused
129. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19.
130. Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, and III, , ¶ 22,
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT (Jan. 31, 2005).
131. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 21, 23
(July 8, 2005).
132. See id. There is little doubt as to the seniority of Dragomir Milošević; the
defense conceded that there were 18,000 troops under his command in the SarajevoRomanija Corps. See Defence’s Response to the Prosecution’s Motion Under Rule 11 bis
and the Trial Chamber Decision of 09.02.2005, ¶¶ 16, 20, Milošević (Feb. 21, 2005).
133. Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 21–23.
134. See id. ¶ 23.
135. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 47(E); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-9623/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 18 (May 17, 2005).
136. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23
(holding that the permanent nature of the position held by the accused amounted to a
“prolonged period exceeding a year”).
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negotiated, signed, participated in negotiations, and
implemented various agreements is a determinant factor in
appreciating the importance of his position.137 The specific tasks
performed by the accused are therefore examined.138 This
cautious approach, which evaluates actual authority shown over
an extended period of time, ensures that the right cases will
remain with the Tribunal for trial. In situations where the
accused possesses the requisite authority but fails to exercise
their power, it is hoped that the bench would discharge this
aspect of the gravity determination.
The level of individual criminal responsibility with which the
accused is charged is also a factor bearing on the level of gravity.
A commander is more likely to be a leader. An indictment
alleging command responsibility, however, would be insufficient
for trial in The Hague on its own.139 An examination of gravity is
still necessary because the bench may dispute the prosecutor’s
assessment of the alleged involvement.140 The latter, in any case,
will be thoroughly examined at trial. Since the bench cannot
conduct a judicial examination into the individual criminal
responsibility, command responsibility in the indictment does
not generally suffice for referral by itself. The bench, therefore,
often bases its decisions on a factual interpretation of the
accused’s role and not on the prosecutor’s assessment of
command responsibility—which is a matter reserved for trial. No
doubt, a more accurate determination of gravity would ensue if
the bench entered into a judicial examination of individual
criminal responsibility, but this would alter the fundamental
character of the referral hearing.

137. See id.
138. See Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral
to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 25 (Sept. 14,
2005) (portraying Norac as holding a “lower non-strategic rank” with limited operative
assignment and without any authority in the police or judicial matters).
139. See Milošević, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 21
(declaring that Milošević’s position, alone, is not “determinative”).
140. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral
of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (July 22, 2005) (rejecting the suggestion in the
indictment that the accussed was a “leader” by virtue of his command power at the local
level). This aspect of the holding was disputed on appeal, but the Appeals Chamber
rejected the argument. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2,
Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 19 (Nov. 15, 2005).
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A similar question concerns the allegation of joint criminal
enterprise141 in the indictment. The issue is whether such
allegation precludes referral by being indicative of higher
gravity.142 In the Mejakić referral the defence took the argument a
step further and argued that “even though the crimes alleged
directly against the accused are not the highest gravity, their
connection to others through the device of the joint criminal
enterprise warrants careful treatment, that can only be
accomplished if the same Tribunal that has considered and is
considering other aspects of this joint criminal enterprise is the
Tribunal to hear and adjudicate this case.”143 In their view, the
accused formed part of joint criminal enterprise with the Serb
political authorities.144 The defense also maintained that the
purpose of the indictment was to establish whether they are
responsible for actions and crimes committed by others whose
cases have been tried by the Tribunal or yet evaded arrest.145
Although it seems sensible to try all co-perpetrators of joint
criminal enterprise before the same court, national or
international, the attempt to examine the Mejakić case in relation
to other cases linked by joint criminal enterprise fails because the
indictment alleged limited participation in the joint criminal
enterprise.146 The bench therefore concluded that the role of the
accused should be seen only on the basis of the particular acts
alleged in the indictment.147 Joint criminal enterprise alone does
not prove gravity.
This does not mean that it could not “forestall the
referral”148 in another case. The bench’s approach in Mejakić is
also consistent with previous case law examining the precise role
141. See Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise; Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial
Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606 (2004) (discussing the concept
of joint criminal enterprise); see also Piacente, supra note 70, at 446 (same).
142. See Mitar Rašević’s Defence Response to Prosecution’s 11 bis Motion and
Defence’s Submission of Further Information in Accordance with the Referral Bench’s
Decision of 14 April 2005 and in the Context of the Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 11
bis, ¶ 11, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT (Apr. 28, 2005)
(arguing that indictment as a co-perpetrator displays a high level of responsibility).
143. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion
for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 17 (July 20, 2005).
144. See id. ¶ 22.
145. See id.
146. See id. ¶ 23.
147. See id. ¶ 24.
148. See id. ¶ 25.
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of the accused.149 The limited input of the accused is balanced
against the willingness of the panel to examine the bigger
picture. The outcome could be different if the role of the
accused in joint criminal enterprise would meaningfully
influence the outcome of other cases or as the bench put it, if
other trials tried before the Tribunal “will have significant
implications for [the Mejakić] trial.”150 The fact that it did not is
key to the referral decision. The bench did not dispute the
existence of joint criminal enterprise nor the degree of
participation alleged by the prosecutor in the indictment and did
not enter a judicial finding. This is in contrast to the approach
taken on superior responsibility.151 Despite its importance, joint
criminal enterprise should be seen as another form of individual
criminal responsibility.152 It is therefore hard to see why it should
be treated differently from command responsibility. Insofar as all
co-perpetrators equally participate in the commission of the same
serious crimes, the approach would be correct. But the approach
is misplaced in any other situation and the gravity requirement
would be harmed as a result.
The element of gravity is central to Rule 11 bis. Of the two
elements in Rule 11 bis, gravity can be determined solely on the
bench’s assessment without any consideration of the situation on
the ground in a given state. If lower gravity is upheld, the bench
may proceed with the rest of the elements contained in the rule.
If, on the other hand, the accused is determined to be a serious
leader, then the case remains with the Tribunal. To facilitate this
task, the bench has devised some objective tests to measure
gravity. Those tests may ease the burden, but do not fully
delimitate the contours of gravity. A more inquisitive approach
could perhaps go a step further and allow a more in-depth
examination of the issues surrounding gravity. Nevertheless, the
approach chosen by the bench, curtailed by the nonexamination
of evidence, emphasises the limited scope of the referral process
149. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (May 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 19 (July 22, 2005).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
152. See Piacente, supra note 70, at 449. But see Shane Darcy, An Effective Measure of
Bringing Justice?: The Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 153, 176 (2004).
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and forms testament to the pragmatic approach assumed by the
bench. Such an approach could provide useful insight for other
courts, such as the ICC, which may be guided by ICTY
jurisprudence when adopting their own standards on gravity.
D. Which State?
Once the bench determines that the indictment is suitable
for a referral under Rule 11 bis(C), the next step is to identify an
appropriate state to receive the referral in order to proceed with
the trial. The ICTY prosecutor, apart from initiating the referral
process by motion, is also entitled to formally request referral to
a particular state.153 The bench, however, may also act proprio
motu and refer the indictment to a state different from the one
requested by the prosecutor.154
If a request for referral is upheld, the indictment is
transferred to a “national” jurisdiction.155 This is understood to
carry the ordinary meaning of all courts pertaining to a nation.156
Referrals under Rule 11 bis to international courts such as the
ICC or the Sierra Leone Special Court are therefore not
envisaged. The referral bench decides which state will receive the
indictment, but not which court within that jurisdiction will
153. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B); see also Janković, Decision on Referral
of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 39
(July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 31 (July 8,
2005).
154. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(D)(i); see also Prosecutor v. Ljubičić,
Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 27 (Apr. 12, 2006) (explaining that a referral proprio motu may only take
place if there are significant problems with referral of the case to the state requested by
the prosecution); Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26 (same).
The bench in this instance unnecessarily self-restricts the discretion that it enjoys to alter
the state of referral and is in contravention with the rule itself.
155. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B) (requiring the accused to be “handed
over to the authorities of [a] State”).
156. Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case
under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26 (May 17, 2005). The defense in the Stanković referral argued that
the Bosnia and Herzegovina War Crimes Chamber could not be considered a national
court it is not comprised exclusively of judges who are nationals of the state. See
Defence’s Motion in Accordance with Rule 11 bis(B), ¶¶ 26–27, Stanković (Dec. 22,
2002). The referral bench correctly determined that the use of international jurists on a
state’s courts does not impact or affect its national character. Stanković, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26.
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ultimately hear the case, nor what law will be applied.157 However,
some discussion of specific courts may be inevitable in making
the determination on the suitability of a state.158 Rule 11 bis(B),
for instance, directs the Tribunal to examine the possibility of
receiving a fair trial under the applicable law.159
Rule 11 bis(A) sanctions three states as potential recipients
of the indictment: the state in which the crime was committed,
the state of arrest, or any state “willing and adequately prepared
to accept” the indictment.160 The prosecutor has consistently
argued that the criteria in Rule 11 bis(A) reflect preferential
ordering among competing States which gives the greatest weight
to the State in whose territory the crime was committed under
Rule 11 bis(A)(i).161 The greater importance of the territorial
state suggests an underlying hierarchy embedded in Rule 11
bis(A).162 A textual interpretation of the relevant provision does
not support this contention. The various options in Rule 11
bis(A) are listed in the alternative. The territorial state may be
mentioned first, but there is no indication that this should be
chosen to the exclusion of the other two options. The bench in
the Mejakić referral, using somewhat unclear language, dismissed
the hierarchy argument but suggested that potential states are
ranked in “descending priority.”163 This does not seem far from
the prosecutor’s position. Both accept that there is an order
implicit in the rule, but they differ in the significance allocated to
157. See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral
of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶ 44 (Apr. 5,
2007); see also Ljubičić, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11
bis, ¶ 47 (July 4, 2006).
158. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 22.
159. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B).
160. Id. R. 11 bis(A).
161. See, e.g., Motion by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I and II
and Confidential Annexes III and IV, ¶ 6, Prosecutor v. Rašević, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT
(Nov. 4, 2005); Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis for Referral of the
Indictment to Another Court, ¶ 6, Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT (July 19,
2005); Motion by the Proscutor Under Rule 11 bis with Annexes I, II, III, and
Confidential Annexes IV, V, and VI, ¶ 6, Prosecutor v. Todović, Case No. IT-97-25 (Nov.
1, 2004); Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis: Partly Confidential (Confidential
Annexes II and III), ¶ 8, Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Sept. 2, 2004).
162. See Ljubičić, Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 25 (Apr. 12, 2006) (summarizing the prosecutor’s argument for
establishing a hierarchy within Rule 11 bis(A)).
163. Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40 (July 20, 2005).

BEKOU_K-FINAL

754

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

the state on whose territory the crime was allegedly committed.
Although the bench recognized the importance of the
territoriality principle, the judges concluded that there is no
established priority assigned to territoriality.164 However, the
articulation of the bench’s position was not unequivocal, leaving
the door open for the prosecutor to repeat the hierarchy
argument in subsequent cases.165 Perhaps the clearest expression
of the Tribunal’s position on hierarchy came in the Janković
appeal.166 The chamber discussed the discretion that the referral
bench is vested with to determine referrals “without establishing
any hierarchy among [the Rule 11 bis(A)] three options.”167 The
bench rejected the hierarchy argument and emphasised that the
task to allocate a case to the competent state for trial is solely
based on the facts of each case, examined against the criteria of
Rule 11 bis(A).168 Preference is not bestowed by the Tribunal on
the territorial state. The standard is instead set at the
“significantly greater nexus” that a state possesses over any other
possible referral states.169 When there are competing
jurisdictions, the bench will refer a case to the state with the
greatest nexus to the accused.170
164. See id.
165. See Ljubičić Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 25, 28; see also Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT,
Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and
Annex B, ¶ 37 (Apr. 5, 2007).
166. Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis
Referral, ¶ 33 (Nov. 15, 2005). The Bench reaffirmed this position in the Mejakić and
Ljubičić appeals as well. Ljubičić, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Referral, ¶ 13
(July 4, 2006); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint
Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40 (Apr. 7, 2006).
167. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 33; see also Mejakić, Decision on
Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 44; Lukić &
Lukić, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A
and Annex B, ¶ 37; Ljubičić Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 28; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40.
168. See Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 33; see also Mejakić, Decision on
Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 44; Lukić &
Lukić, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A
and Annex B, ¶ 37; Ljubičić, Decision to Refer the Case to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 28; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40.
169. Janković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 37.
170. See id.; see also Ljubičić ,Trial Decision, ¶ 29 (focusing on the “weaker” nexus of
a requested state to deny referral to that jurisdiction).
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Criminal jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality is found in
Rule 11 bis(A)(i).171 This provision confers jurisdiction on a state
in whose territory the crime was committed.172 There are two
possible interpretations of the principle of territoriality from
Rule 11 bis. The first is that the notion of territory would
correspond to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and
referrals under this option would take place in any of the states
that emerged from the break up of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia in 1991. This would be an incorrect assertion. All of
the states which emerged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
acquired international recognition before the ICTY was even
established.173 An interpretation that included the entire territory
of the former Yugoslavia would infringe upon the sovereignty of
these states. The other, more suitable interpretation would
consider the individual territories of the emerged states. For
example, if the crime occurred in Sarajevo, the relevant territory
would be that of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the crimes
committed around Knin, the territorial state would be Croatia
and so on.
Besides territoriality, Rule 11 bis also provides for referral to
the state where the accused was arrested.174 This state may not be
identical to the territorial state. The link with the state of arrest
might be tentative and limited to the fact that the person was
merely present within that territory at the time of the arrest.
Interestingly, Rule 11 bis(A)(ii) does not require an examination
into whether the custodial state would be willing to try the
person, nor whether its legal system would be able to accept the
case.175 From a practical perspective, there may not be national
legislation granting jurisdiction on the basis of custody or even

171. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(i). Rule 11 bis(A)(i) is widely used
primarily due to the practical advantage it offers regarding easy access to evidence and
witnesses.
172. Id. R. 11 bis(A)(i).
173. Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina became members of the United
Nations on May 22, 1992, and Macedonia became a member on April 8, 1993. See U.N.
Member States, List of Member States U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.A/295/Add.5 (Oct. 6,
2006), available at http://secint50.un.org/members/list.shtml. The ICTY Statute was
subsequently adopted on May 25, 1993. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra
note 19.
174. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(ii).
175. See id.
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criminalizing the acts in question.176 Yet, if referred, the state
would have to accept the indictment and proceed with trial
because the ICTY is a creation of the Security Council acting
under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which renders its
decisions binding on all U.N. member states.177 Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the referral bench would transfer an indictment to
an unwilling or incapable forum. Even though the “willing and
adequately prepared” analysis does not form part of Rule 11
bis(A)(i) and (ii) inquiry, it may, however, come under the fair
trial requirement of Rule 11 bis(B).178 When discussing referral to
the state of arrest, some examination of the legal system would be
desirable so as to guarantee successful trial after referral. An
amendment of Rule 11 bis to reflect this should, therefore, be
considered.
An altogether different challenge is faced by voluntary
surrenders. In the context of Rule 11 bis, it is of interest to
examine whether the state that the person voluntarily surrenders
within may be equated with the state of arrest for the purposes of
referral. At the inception of ad hoc tribunals, few would have
thought that voluntary surrenders would become such an
effective means of bringing the alleged perpetrators to The
Hague.179 Fear of “detention” by the SFOR in Bosnia and
Herzegovina led to a number voluntarily surrenders.180 The
176. See Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, ¶¶ 40, 56, Letter
dated 17 June 2002 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 (June 19, 2002).
177. See U.N. Charter art. 48.
178. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule
11 bis Referral, ¶ 40 (Nov. 15, 2005) (noting that “[a]s a strictly textual matter, Rule 11
bis(A)[(ii)] does not require that the jurisdiction be ‘willing and adequately prepared to
accept’ a transferred case,” but that the analysis is implicit in Rule 11 bis(B)).
179. See John B. Allock, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia, in CONFRONTING THE YUGOSLAV CONTROVERSIES 346, 368–78 (Charles
Ingrao & Thomas A. Emmert eds., 2009); VOJIN DIMITRIJEVIC, SILAZENJE S UMA
[LOSING MIND] 318–19, 389 (2006) (Serb.); see also Julija Bogoeva, Odgovornost za
zlocine [Responsibility for the Crimes], REPUBLIKA, No. 169-170 (1997), available at
http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/97/170/170_22.HTM. See
generally VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS (2008).
180. See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 24, ¶ 222; see also JOHN HAGAN,
JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 108 (2003)
(quoting a legal advisor in the prosecutor’s office as stating that the accused became
aware “that there was an easy way and a hard way to come here,” particularly after the
death and injury of Drjlaća and Kupreškić during their arrests); RACHEL KERR, THE
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policy of the moderate Serbian government during the period of
2004–2008 also promoted a number of voluntary surrenders in
exchange for special benefits.181 The ten individuals indicted in
the Kordić and Kupsreškić cases were the first accused to surrender
voluntarily182 and many more followed. Be it the change in the
scene on the ground or the exercise of political pressure,
voluntary surrenders became common.183 It was thus argued in
some referral hearings, that the surrender of the accused to
national authorities referral to that state suitable on the basis that
it was the custodial state.184 The bench is yet to address this
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA; AN EXERCISE IN
LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 170 (2004) (quoting a Stabilization Force spokesperson
as remarking that “SFOR at the door . . . may be bad for your health”).
181. The Serbian government under the leadership by Vojislav Koštunica
introduced the so-called “system of voluntary surrender,” which offered significant
financial benefits to those who surrendered on their own accord. See Zakon o pravima
optuženog u pritvoru Međunarodnog Krivičnog Tribunala i članova njegove porodice
[Law on the Rights of the Accused in Custody of the International Criminal Tribunal
and Members of Their Families], Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije [Official Gazette of the
Republic of Serbia] br. 35/2004, Mar. 30, 2004 (Serb.), available at
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/files/lat/pdf/zakoni/2004/pdf_015_1469-04_lat.zip. This
law was challenged before the Constitutional Court of Serbia and its application was
suspended only fifteen days after its adoption pursuant to an interim decision of the
court on April 15, 2004. See Odluku Ustavni sud Republike Srbije [Constitutional Court
of the Republic of Serbia], br. IU-152/2004, Apr. 15, 2004, Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije
br. 42/2004, Apr 15, 2004 (Serb.). The court, however, never reached a final decision
on the matter. Despite these complications, indictees who surrendered were still
awarded substantial compensation from “private sources.” See N. Čaluković & N. M.
Jovanović, Za predaju do pola miliona evra [Up to Half Million Euros for Surrender], BLIC
ONLINE (Belgrade), Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.blic.rs/stara_arhiva/politika/81406/zapredaju-do-pola-miliona-evra. This system led to the surrender of a number of senior
military and civilian officials, including Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, General
Pavkovic; Chief of the Third Army, General Lazarevic; Chief of Kosovo Police, General
Lukic; and the Minister of Interior of the Republic of Srpska, Mico Stanisic. See VESNA
PETROVIĆ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 2005, at 462–63 (2006). There
was a previous wave of voluntary surrenders of Serbian high officials in 2002 and 2003
following the adoption of the Directive on the Assistance to ICTY Indictees. See Nenad lj.
Stefanovic, Haski Uskrs [Easter in the Hague], VREME (Belgrade), Apr. 25, 2002, at 14
(identifying the President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic; President of the
Republic of Serpska Krajina, Milan Martic; and Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia,
Nikola Sainovic as individuals who recently surrendered).
182. See Fifth Annual Report of the ICTY, supra note 24, at ¶ 113.
183. The transfers of indictees to The Hague from Serbia was a highly political
issue due to the animosity towards the ICTY. See PETROVIĆ, supra note 181, at 462–63,
473.
184. See Transcript of Record at 130, Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT96-23/2-PT (Mar. 4, 2005) (arguing at a Rule 11 bis motion hearing that “he personally
surrendered in Serbia and therefore meets the 11 bis criteria”); see also Serbia and

BEKOU_K-FINAL

758

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

argument, but it is unlikely that this position would be tenable if
the surrender was accomplished without any state involvement.
This is not to say that the involvement of the state must only
occur through its criminal justice system. Using Serbia as an
example, political measures, such as the adoption of incentivebased laws, threats of imminent arrest, and other coercive
methods, led to a wave of surrenders.185 In that case, the line
separating arrest from surrender is very vague, and the state of
arrest is thus put on par with that of surrender. It is hard to
foresee that the referral bench would in any case transfer the
indictment to the state of arrest if it is not willing and able to
accept it in practice. The state of arrest could therefore have
been omitted altogether, as the same outcome could have been
achieved through application of Rule 11 bis(A)(iii), which is
examined next.
Of the elements in Rule 11 bis, subsection (A)(iii) is perhaps
the most interesting. By virtue of the provision, the referral
bench may refer the indictment to the authorities of the state
“having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared
to accept such a case.”186 This provision underscores the
universality of international criminal justice and guarantees the
involvement of more states, which, if applied consistently, would
enhance uniformity. Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) therefore leaves open the
possibility of referrals to states which have no link to either the
alleged crime(s) or the accused. Nevertheless, the referral bench
cannot select a state for referral under Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) blindly.
Under this provision a state must have jurisdiction over the
crimes charged and be willing and capable to receive the
indictment.187 The rule does not, however, specify the type of
jurisdiction required.188 This would theoretically encompass a
system as broad as universal jurisdiction. In short, trial may occur
in any state under Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) so long as a willing and
capable forum is available, regardless of where and by whom the
crime was committed.
Montenegro’s Submission in the Proceedings Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 5, Prosecutor v.
Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Jan. 14, 2005) (submitting that “arrest of the accused
should be equaled with voluntary surrender” for purposes of Rule 11 bis).
185. See supra notes 180–81.
186. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(iii).
187. See id.
188. See id.
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The rule does not elaborate upon the meaning of
willingness and capacity, nor does it contain any indication as to
how these requirements are measured.189 Both concepts are
reminiscent of the ICC complementarity regime undner which
national fora must be “willing and able” genuinely to deal with a
case.190 This provision of Rule 11 bis was inserted after the
adoption of the Rome Statute,191 so the influence of the latter is
evident. Nevertheless, Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) differs significantly from
article 17 of the Rome Statute, the main provision on
complementarity. On a purely textual level, Rule 11 bis(A)(iii)
utilizes the phrase “adequately prepared” as opposed to the
equivalent term “able” in the Rome Statute.192 But the distinction
is not simply linguistic. In examining “willingness” the bench
does not seek to determine whether there is an attempt by the
state to thwart trial,193 but whether the state has affirmatively
expressed an interest in exercising jurisdiction over a case.194
There is a fundamental difference in the underlying motive.
When examining ability, the aim of the bench is to determine
whether a state’s legal system could cope with the indictment in
terms of the existing legislation, adequate procedures, and, more
generally, the capacity to undertake the main trial.195 Capability
in Rule 11 bis is therefore closer to the “otherwise unavailable”
concept found in article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, which covers
wider issues of unavailability.196 Moreover, the formulation in
Rule 11 bis(A) differs from complementarity in its fundamental
conception. Unlike complementarity, the ICTY examines a
189. See id.
190. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, pmbl. ¶ 10, arts. 1, 17.
191. Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) was adopted on June 10, 2004. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3,
R. 11 bis(A)(iii).
192. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 17, with ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R.
11 bis(A)(iii).
193. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, art. 17(2) (indicating what constitutes
“unwilling”).
194. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 36, 39–42 (July 20, 2005).
195. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 27, 45 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 21 (May 17, 2005).
196. See Timothy L.H. McCormack & Sue Robertson, Jurisdictional Aspects of the
Rome Statute for the New International Criminal Court, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 635, 645 (1999);
see also Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision on Rule 11 bis,
¶¶ 16–17 (Aug. 30, 2006) (discussing Norway’s unavailability).
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domestic legal system for purposes of Rule 11 bis not to decide
whether a case ought to be removed from the national forum but
to determine whether the indictment may be sent to that state for
trial.197 The rule in this instance places more trust in the national
legal system at a conceptual level, notwithstanding the primacy
exerted by the statute of the Tribunal itself over the crimes in
question.198
Within this framework, Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) is potentially
applicable to a large number of states. Despite nationality finding
a prominent place in both national and international
conceptions of jurisdiction,199 it is not found in Rule 11 bis.
Nevertheless, states will sometimes invoke Rule 11 bis(A)(iii) in
order to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving their own
nationals.200 Curiously, these states focus their arguments on
diplomatic protection.201 Diplomatic protection, although linked,
197. See supra notes 25–30 (juxtaposing the terms “referral” and “deferral” as they
are used in international jurisprudence).
198. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 19, art. 9 (noting the
Tribunal’s primacy within the concurrent jurisdiction structure).
199. See Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in I THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 583, 609–10
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (highlighting that article 12 of the Rome Statute has
been incorporated into in the criminal code of all states comprising the former
Yugoslavia); S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 91–92 (Sept. 7)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (discussing public international law within the context of the
passive personality principle rather than a citizen’s nationality); see also IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303–04 (7th ed. 2008) (providing a brief
overview of the nationality principle in modern public international law since the time
of S.S. “Lotus”).
200. See Serbia and Montenegro’s Submission in the Proceedings Under Rule 11
bis, ¶ 7, Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT (Jan. 14, 2005) (arguing that a state
holds “special rights and responsibilities” over its nationals as parens patriae); see also Savo
Todovic’s Defence Notie on the Serbia and Montenegro Willingness to Accept the Case
of Savo Todovic Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 3, Prosecutor v. Rašević and Todović, Case No. IT97-25/1-PT (May 5, 2005) (using citizenship as an additional basis for referral).
201. See Serbia and Montenegro’s Submission in the Proceedings Under Rule 11
bis, ¶ 7, Mejakić; see also Defence Further Submission Regarding Gojko Jankovic’s
Citizenship, ¶ 2, Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT (advancing the
outrageous argument that the accused is not a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro but
fulfils all the preconditions to be one). The bench has so far not seriously examined the
issue of nationality as it relates to jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case
No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential
Annexes I and II, ¶ 32 (July 8, 2005) (noting the Bench was seized of the matter but
ostensibly favoring an approach that takes into account whether there is a genuine link);
see also Nottebohm (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 24–26 (Apr. 6) (first
case to require a genuine connection); Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 57 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 173–76, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002)
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is ancillary to nationality and involves taking over a national’s
claim against a state for a wrongful act suffered by the national
before an international tribunal.202 This bears no relevance to a
Rule 11 bis procedure as there is no damage suffered by an
individual that would require protection from another state. It is
hard to see how diplomatic protection can fit with Rule 11 bis
given the nature of the criminal process.
Nevertheless, the absence of nationality as a possible
jurisdictional principle in Rule 11 bis(A) is striking. Most
perpetrators originally shared common Yugoslav nationality. But
since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the emergence of separate independent states
within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, the accused possess
different nationalities, which may explain the absence of the
principle from Rule 11 bis. All crimes committed in the territory
of the conflict would in any case be covered under the principle
of territoriality.203 The absence of jurisdiction based on
nationality is not insurmountable; the bench is free to send the
indictment elsewhere on the basis of Rule 11 bis(A)(iii).204 The
same may be said for the passive personality principle,205 another
important principle of jurisdiction, which is equally missing from
Rule 11 bis.
As regards the potential state for referral, Rule 11 bis(A)
adopts a pragmatic approach that takes into account the practical
situation on the ground. That territoriality takes precedence in
practice is not surprising. However, referring most indictments to
a single state and potentially to the same court (usually the War
Crimes Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina) is likely to overwhelm
(noting that the International Law Commission did not include a genuine link
requirement and that Nottebohm should be limited to its facts by virtue of the changing
needs of today’s globalized world).
202. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30); Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 28); see also Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 58 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 81, U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (2003)
(“Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or other means of
peaceful settlement by a state adopting in its own right the cause of its national in
respect of an injury to that national arising from an internationally wrongful act of
another state.”).
203. See supra notes 171–73.
204. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A)(iii).
205. See BROWNLIE, supra note 199, at 304; Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive
Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14–30 (1993).
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the state of referral. The latter is then required to turn around
cases—which would have taken many years before the ICTY—
without access to similar budget, staff, or resources.206 For
example, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which
the majority of the referred cases were transferred, had 275
pending cases in April of 2008.207 The court only has eight
available courtrooms208 and an annual budget of just under €5.5
million,209 in comparison to the Tribunal’s biannual budget of
€347.5 million.210
The preeminence of the state of arrest in Rule 11 bis
adjudication over other more established principles of
jurisdiction remains striking. This perhaps caters to the practical
reality of dealing with international criminals who flee the
territory of the former Yugoslavia. The ambit of the rule is
nevertheless expanded through the operation of Rule 11
bis(A)(iii).211 So far, however, the bench has taken a conservative
approach and referred all but one indictment to the territorial
state, as requested by the prosecutor.212 It is understandable why
the bench has not ventured out to states unrelated to the
conflict. Should the bench decide that certain cases could be
more appropriately dealt with elsewhere, the possibility at least
206. See Katie Zoglin, The Future of War Crimes Prosecutions in the Former Yugoslavia:
Accountability or Junk Justice?, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 41, 72 (2005).
207. See SUD BOSE I HERCEGOVINE [SUD BIH] [COURT OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA], BROJ PREDMETA ODJELIMA I I II KRIVIČNOG ODJELJENJA SUDA BOSNE I
HERCEGOVINE DO 30. APRILA 2008 [NUMBER OF CASES BEFORE SECTIONS I AND II OF THE
CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE STATE COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS OF APRIL 30,
2008],
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/statistika/2008-04-30/
Broj_predmeta_pred_Odjelima_I_i_II_-_april_2008.pdf.
208. See SUD BIH, ISKORIŠTENOST SUDNICA PREMA BROJU DANA U MJESECU DO 30.
APRIL 2008 [UTILIZATION OF COURTROOMS BROKEN DOWN BY MONTH AS OF APRIL 30,
2008],
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/statistika/2008-04-30/
Iskoristenost_sudnica_prema_broju_dana_u_mjesecu_-_april_2008.pdf.
209. See Sud BiH, Office of Public Relations (PIOS): Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=7&id=15&jezik=b (last visited Feb. 20,
2010) (listing the court’s annual budget for 2009).
210. See Fifth Comm., Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/62/599 (Dec. 24, 2007).
211. See supra notes 186–98(displaying the wide discretion of the bench to refer an
indictment to potentially any state that meets certain criteria).
212. Vladimir Kovačević’s indictment was the only one not referred on the grounds
of territoriality. See Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2-I, Decision on Referral
of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential and Partly Ex Parte Annexes (Nov. 17,
2006).
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remains. The ICTY experience gained from this part of the
process could benefit the ICC when it examines the suitability of
national fora as part of its decision on complementarity. Despite
its similarities with Rule 11 bis, the ICC process differs in the
nature of the complementarity determination. Another
difference lies in the presence of the nationality principle for
conferring jurisdiction and the potentially larger number of
states that would need to be considered when examining
complementarity. Rule 11 bis precedent may prove useful in
terms of process and methods used to make such determinations.
II. APPLICABLE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
As the purpose of the referral hearing is to examine the
suitability of an indictment for referral, the bench recognizes
that it does not possess the competent authority to decide in any
binding way what law will be applied at the national level once a
referral is upheld.213 This authority rests with the courts of the
state the indictment is referred to. Although the bench has
refuted any suggestion that an obligation to determine the
applicable substantive law exists,214 it has nevertheless considered
potentially applicable law in each of the cases it has examined to
date. The bench has not felt the need to ground this in the RPE.
A discussion on substantive law is necessary primarily for two
reasons. First, under Rule 11 bis(B), the referral bench needs to
satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the
death penalty will not be imposed.215 Such a determination

213. See Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to
Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 31 (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision
on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 45 (Apr. 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case
No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32, (Sept. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-9623/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 27 (July 22, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 43 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević &
Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 34 (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32 (May 17, 2005).
214. See Mejakić, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 46, 48 (addressing arguments alleging the referral bench had
erred in refraining from determining the controlling law and the bench’s response).
215. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B); Somers, supra note 51, at 182.
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cannot be made in the abstract. To the extent that fulfilment of
these two criteria above may only be determined through a
limited examination of applicable law, the referral bench is
entitled to look into all available options.216 However, the bench’s
findings are not binding on the state to which the case is referred
and are, in any event, limited.217 Second, although this has not
arisen in the ICTY jurisprudence, there is an inherent need to
examine the applicable substantive law when considering
referrals pursuant to Rule 11 bis(A)(iii), particularly in order to
decide whether the capability requirement is met.218 The absence
of adequate legislation would hinder or arguably preclude
acceptance of the indictment. Moreover, given that Rule 11 bis
does not provide criteria to assist the bench with its decision on
capability, an examination of substantive law should not be
precluded, although this is not explicitly envisaged in Rule 11
bis(A)(i) and (ii). It would be interesting to see whether the
bench would engage in a more detailed discussion of substantive
law, if it were to decide upon a referral proprio motu.219 In such an
instance, the bench, in lieu of the prosecutor, would have to
make a case for referral to a particular state, which would in all
likelihood require arguments in favour of the suitability of the
forum.
The aim of the bench is to satisfy itself that an adequate
legal framework would be in place enabling prosecution of the
accused who, if found guilty, will be appropriately punished.220
The bench therefore limits its examination to those aspects of
substantive law that would assist it in making the above
determination. Accordingly, the bench does not seek to prove or
disprove the prosecutorial or defense submissions. Instead,
consideration is given to what seems to be the “apparent
position” on substantive law to determine whether a referral
order may be proceeded with.221 No indication is given as to what
216. See Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 43.
217. See id.
218. See McCormack & Robertson, supra note 196, at 645–46.
219. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B).
220. See id.
221. See Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to
Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32 (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the
Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 38 (Sept. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v.
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the bench considers to be the apparent position or how it makes
this determination.
National courts to which indictments are referred bear
exclusive responsibility regarding the determination of the
applicable substantive law and will have to make some difficult
decisions post referral. Conscious of its limited mandate, the
bench does not wish to trespass on what is inherently a domestic
function.222 Had a more in-depth analysis of the conflicting
provisions beyond the mere exposition of the law been
undertaken, the bench would have been able to provide clearer
guidance to the national courts regarding the law to be applied.
Moreover, national prosecutions would benefit from such expert
legal analysis by the Tribunal. However, a more substantial
examination of applicable law would defy the main aim of the
referral process, which is to reduce the Tribunal’s burden in light
of the completion strategy. Such an undertaking would have
taken up precious resources, and would not have been consistent
with the nature of Rule 11 bis as an important weapon in the
battle against time. A detailed examination of applicable
substantive law after the referral of the indictment would be
beyond the scope of this Article, but some potential problems
that national courts may face will be briefly examined.
The first question is what law would apply. The bench has
adopted an almost identical approach on this issue in the
indictments it has examined to date. As the law applicable at the
time the crimes were committed, following the break-up of the
former Yugoslavia, no longer applies, national courts will have to
determine the applicable law with due regard to the principle of
legality.223 While this principle recognizes that the applicable law
Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 23
(July 22, 2005); Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant
to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 48; Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 37 (May 17, 2005).
222. See Somers, supra note 51, at 182.
223. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950,
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, 2061 A-2889 U.N.T.S. 12. A
consolidated copy of the amended treaty is electronically available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/
englishanglais.pdf. All states of the former Yugoslavia are parties to the convention. See
Council of Eur., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

BEKOU_K-FINAL

766

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:723

Freedoms
CETS
No.:
005,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=05/03/2010&CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
The courts from the region took diverse approaches. While Serbian courts tend to apply
the basic Criminal Law of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”), Krivični
zakon socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Criminal Code of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] [hereinafter SFRY Criminal Code], Službeni list
Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia] br. 36/1977, July 15, 1977, translated in LAWYERS COMM. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL COURTS, AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 22–23,
25–33 (1995), Bosnian courts did not take a firm position on this matter. Compare
Okruzni sud Beograd [Belgrade District Court], Indictment Against Miroljub Vujović et
al., No. KTZR 4/03 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/
html_trz/optuznice/o_2005_09_16_eng.pdf (applying the Criminal Code of the SFRY
for an offense committed prior to 1992), with Okruzni sud Beograd, Indictment Against
Slobodan Medić et al., No. KTRZ 3/05 (July 10, 2005), available at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/o_2006_10_09_eng.pdf
(applying
the criminal code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for offenses committed after
1992). The State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”) has applied the Criminal
Code of BiH, Krivični zakon Bosne i Hercegovine [Criminal Code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina] [hereinafter BiH Criminal Code], Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine
[Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina], br. 37/2003, Nov. 22, 2003, translated at
http://www.anti-trafficking.gov.ba/fajlovi/kazeneni_zakon_bh.pdf-.pdf,
but
other
courts in the Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH, the two political entities of
BiH, have applied the basic criminal code of the SFRY, supra. See, e.g., Humanitarian
Law Cntr., Nacionalna suđenja za ratne zločine—Bosna i Hercegovina [National Trial
for War Crimes—Bosnia and Herzegovina], http://www.hlc-rdc.org/PravdaIReforma/
Sudjenje-za-ratne-zlocine/SudjenjaZaRatne-Nacionalna-sudjenja-za-ratne-zlocine/
Sudjenje-za-ratne-nacionalna-BiH/151.sr.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (discussing
indictement on January 30, 2001 of Ranko Jakovljević in the District Court of Banja Luka
in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Republic of Srpska—which was renamed
Criminal Code of SFRY). With the decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Abduladhim Maktouf, by which it determined that the application of the
BiH Criminal Code is consistent with the principle of legality, these discrepancies in
application of the law before different courts in the same state should be resolved. See
Odluku Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine [Constitutional Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina], br. AP-1785/06, Mar. 30, 2007 (Abduladhim Maktouf), available at
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/odluke/povuci_pdf.php?pid=73135. It should be noted that
all cases referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina are tried in accordance with the BiH
Criminal Code. See, e.g., Sud Bosne i Hercegovine [Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina],
br. X-KRŽ-05/70, Mar 28, 2007 (Stanković). Croatian courts, on the other hand, apply
the Penal Code of Croatia, Kazneni zakon Republike Hrvatske [Penal Code of the
Republic of Croatia], Narodne novine [Official Gazette] br. 110/2003, Nov. 20, 2003
[hereinafter Croatia Penal Code], as it existed at the time when the crimes were
committed. See, e.g., Županijskom Sudu u Zagrebu [County Court of Zagreb],
Optužnicu protiv Rahima Ademija i Mirka Norca [hereinafter Indictment Against
Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac], br. K-DO-349/05 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at
http://ivojosipovic.com/knjige/odgovornost/pdf/D/4.%20OPTUZNICE/
06.%20Optuznica%20Norac-Ademi.pdf. In Serbia, the Special Prosecutor for War
Crimes bases his charges on the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of the SFRY,
supra, in force at the time the crimes were comitted. See, e.g., Okruzni sud Beogard
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is that which was in force at the time of the commission of the
crime, it also allows for retrospective application of posterior law,
if the latter is more lenient. All sides to the referral hearing have
presented arguments based on varying interpretations of the
principle,224 but the bench has so far refrained from indicating its
position on the matter. The absence of a “judicially established
test” for the determination of leniency has been noted by the
bench,225 which indicates that the decision on applicable law
national courts are called to make cannot rely on preestablished
criteria and implies that it is of considerable complexity which
will burden the national court.
Other areas that the bench has touched upon include the
absence of the category of crimes against humanity in the
legislation of the former Yugoslavia,226 the nonequivalence of the
provisions relating to command responsibility with the ICTY
Statute,227 the potential for direct applicability of international
[Belgrade District Court], Indictment Against Vladimir Kovačević, No. KTZR 5/07 (July
26,
2007),
available
at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/
o_2007_07_26_eng.pdf.
224. See Response of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Request
for Further Written Submissions by the Referral Bench in the Mejakić and Stanković
Cases at 5–6, Stanković (Mar. 22, 2005) (acknowledging the legality principle but arguing
that the 2003 BiH Criminal Code provides a “more complete exposition of the law” and
should therefore be applied instead). Identical arguments have been made in other
cases. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 30; Prosecutor
v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule
11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 37 (July 8, 2005). Depending on whether
the 2003 code is more lenient or not, the above argument may violate the legality
principle, if applied purely on the basis that it provides for more detailed provisions. See
supra note 223 (outlining the principle of legality).
225. Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion
for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 47 (July 20, 2005).
226. See Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 33; Stanković,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 38–39. Consequently, in the case of
Ademi and Norac before the Croatian court, two counts of the ICTY indictment on crimes
against humanity were excluded from the Croatian indictment and were converted to
the war crime against civilian population. See Indictment Against Rahim Ademi and
Mirko Norac, br. K-DO-349/05 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://ivojosipovic.com/
knjige/odgovornost/pdf/D/4.%20OPTUZNICE/06.%20Optuznica%20NoracAdemi.pdf. Crimes against humanity have been included in the adapted Bosnian
indictments. See, e.g., Sud BiH, Indictment Against Paško Ljubičić, No. KT-RZ-140/06
(Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//
pasko_ljubicic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf.
227. See Prosecutor v. Ljubičić, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the Case to
Bosnia and Herzegovina Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 34–35 (Apr. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the
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law as the basis for prosecution,228 the different set of penalties
applicable then and now,229 and the existence of statute of
limitations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(“SFRY”) code.230
As a supplementary element, the examination of applicable
law aids the determination of other elements in Rule 11 bis.
Applicable law has not, however, been discussed in any depth in
the jurisprudence, thereby limiting its usefulness. An
examination of the availability of an adequate legal framework
Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 40–42 (Sept. 14, 2005); Mejakić, Decision
on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 15, 17; Janković,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 42, 43. The question of command
responsibility is particularly interesting in the case of Ademi and Norac in Croatia. The
Penal Code of Croatia does not contain a provision on criminal liability for command
responsibility. See generally Croatia Penal Code, Narodne novine br. 110/2003, Nov. 20,
2003. However, the Supreme Court of Croatia has held that criminal charges against
commanders for failing to prevent subordinates from committing war crimes could
possibly be based on general domestic theories of criminal liability for failure to act in
conjunction with Articles 86 and 87 of Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See
Rješenje Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske [Supreme Court of Croatia], br. I K-588/02-9,
Oct. 17, 2002 (M.S.), available at http://sudskapraksa.vsrh.hr/supra/. However, the
second element of command responsibility for punishing subordinates is not covered by
this decision, nor is it contained in the Ademi and Norac indictment. See Mission to
Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, Supplementary Report: War Crime Proceedings in Croatia and Findings
from Trial Monitoring 3–4 (June 22, 2004); see also Indictment Against Rahim Ademi and
Mirko Norac, br. K-DO-349/05 (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://ivojosipovic.com/
knjige/odgovornost/pdf/D/4.%20OPTUZNICE/06.%20Optuznica%20NoracAdemi.pdf.
228. See Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 49(remarking that article 4a of the BiH criminal code
requires consideration of international law); Janković, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 41 (same); Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of
Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 62 (same).
229. See Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 30, 35;
Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶
59; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 40. The twenty years
sentencing cap and use of the death penalty in the former Yugoslavia were replaced with
a maximum sentence of twenty to forty-five years in the BiH criminal code. See BiH
Criminal Code art. 42(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 37/2003, Nov. 22,
2003, translated at http://www.anti-trafficking.gov.ba/fajlovi/kazeneni_zakon_bh.pdf.pdf.
230. See Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 55; Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 41. This
would seem to be a relatively minor problem for national courts because the SFRY
criminal code, even if applied, would not bar offenses committed in 1992 until 2017. See
SFRY Criminal Code art. 95(1)(1), Službeni list Socijalističke Federativne Republike
Jugoslavije br. 36/1977, July 15, 1977. The issue, of course, would be whether national
courts would be overwhelmed with cases that are likely to last until then.
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and penalty structure, although of some use to the bench,
constitutes a missed opportunity for expert assistance to be
provided to the referral state. The bench has never intervened to
dictate what law is to be applied, since this is exclusively a
domestic matter. At the same time, it is called on to decide
referrals based on this exceedingly limited scrutiny of national
systems. The bench’s approach is a taster of the law that may be
applied once the indictment is referred. Compared to its current
secondary function, making substantive law an element of Rule
11 bis, would have been of greater usefulness to states and would
also have delivered more accurate results for the bench. The
rule, as it stands, emphasizes how distinct the two levels of
adjudication are and denotes the limits of the bench’s inquiry.
An amendment of Rule 11 bis to formally include substantive law
would have therefore been welcome.
III. FAIR TRIAL AND SENTENCING ISSUES
A. Fair Trial
A prime concern of any criminal process is to ensure that
the accused receives a fair trial. The right to fair trial is
guaranteed in the ICTY Statute, which follows international
standards.231 Rule 11 bis further requires the Tribunal to ensure
that the accussed will receive a fair trial after transfer to the
national jurisdiction.232 Fair trial issues therefore cannot be
disregarded when deciding referrals requests.233 Where this
element differs from other elements in Rule 11 bis is that the
bench, at the time of the referral hearing, has very limited insight
as to whether the accused will in fact receive fair trial after the
231. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 21; see also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 223, art. 6.
232. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(B) (mandating that the accused “will”
get a fair trial).
233. See Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral,
¶¶ 27–28 (Sept. 1, 2005) (acknowledging that the referral bench’s use of the word
“should” was imprecise but holding that “should” in this instance meant “will”); Ademi
& Norac, Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 53 (highlighting that the fair trial condition in Rule 11 bis proceedings
requires fairness not only with regard to the accused, but also towards all interested
parties, which includes the victims and the international community).
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indictment has been transferred. Although this cannot be
assessed in the abstract, the hearing offers very little scope for the
precise determination of this requirement. The bench is
required to make a finding on a future judicial process, over
which it has no control. This is an arduous task given that the
bench has limited ability to anticipate. Its examination would,
inevitably, lie in the hypothetical sphere. For more reliable
findings, fair trial issues should also have been revisited
postreferral.234 At the referral stage, the bench restricts its
assessment to determining whether an adequate legal framework
exists in the prospective referral state and whether this legal
structure is sufficient to guarantee fair trial.235
In ICTY jurisprudence, both the bench and the appeals
chamber have addressed the main concerns raised by the
defendants in some detail. These decisions cover a number of
issues such as the composition of the court,236 trial without undue
delay, the right to choose one’s counsel, adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of a defence, the right to attend trial
and examine witnesses, witness availability and protection, and
pretrial detention on remand.237 Each of these issues will be
examined below in turn.
The starting point in the bench’s examination is to
determine whether prompt trial is guaranteed in national law.

234. This is partly achieved through the reporting process examined infra.
235. The Bench has, in each case, reviewed the applicable constitutional provisions
but also the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Codes as well as membership to
international treaties, such as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 223. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No.
IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential
Annex A and Annex B, ¶¶ 69–74 (Apr. 5, 2007); Prosecutor v. Janković, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 62 (July 22, 2005); Mejakić, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 68; Rašević & Todović,
Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 83;
Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 55.
236. Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 83–86 (showing that the defense base their arguments on the lack of
impartiality and independence of the state court in BiH based on the criteria on the
election of judges, the composition of the court, and the provisions on disqualification).
237. See Lukić & Lukić, Decision on Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶¶ 76–97 (providing an overview of the issues
relating to fair trial).
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Once it has been established that it is, review of further
provisions in more detail follows.238
Temporally speaking, the transfer of indictments from the
Tribunal to national courts will inevitably lead to some delay.
Upon transfer to national courts, the indictment requires
adaption.239 This is not usually a lengthy process. In practice, the
state prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina needs approximately
three months to adapt an indictment.240 The Serbian prosecutor
238. See, e.g., Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 32
(explaining the general principle that the Tribunal cannot mandate the law that will be
applied at a national level but must examine it to ensure that there is an adequate legal
framework to try the accused). For the relevant provisions of the code of criminal
procedure of BiH, see Zakon krivičnom prostupku Bosne i Hercegovine [Criminal
Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure
for BiH] arts. 13, 135, 137(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 36/2003, Nov.
21,
2003,
translated
at
http://www.anti-trafficking.gov.ba/fajlovi/
Zakon_o_kazenenom_postupku_BH.pdf-14.pdf. For the relevant provisions of the code
of criminal procedure of Croatia, see Zakon o kaznenom postupku (pročišćeni tekst)
[Code of Criminal Procedure (revised text)] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure
for RH] arts. 10, 110–11, 114, Narodne Novine br. 62, Apr. 12, 2003. For the relevant
provisions of the code of criminal procedure of Serbia, see Zakonik o krivičnom
postupku [Code of Criminal Procedure] [hereinafter Code of Criminal Procedure for
RS] arts. 16, 144, 146, Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije br. 46/2006, May 25, 2006, translated
at http://www.osce.org/documents/srb/2007/04/24175_en.pdf.
239. See, e.g., Zakon o ustupanju predmeta od strane Međunarodnog krivičnog
suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju Tužilaštvu Bosne i Hercegovine i korištenju dokaza pribavljenih
od Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju u postupcima pred sudovima u
Bosni i Hercegovini [Law on the Transfer of Cases from the International criminal court
for the Former Yugoslavia to the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Use of Evidence Collected by the International criminal court for the Former Yugoslavia
in Proceedings Before the Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina] [hereinafter BiH Transfer
Law] art. 2(1), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br. 61/2004, Dec. 29, 2004
(establishing the procedure for adapting a referred indictment). The national court
adopts the indictment already prepared by the Tribunal and simply adapts it to comply
with domestic law requirements. See id. art. 2(1). However, nothing prevents national
authorities from adding new charges or defendants to the existing indictment. See id. art.
2(2). Although this may lead to further delays, the prospect of further amendment is not
fundamentally inconsistent with the right to fair trial because the discretion to amend
filings falls within the powers of the court before which the case will be heard and is no
different than the procedure of the ICTY. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 50.
240. For example, the case against Radovan Stanković was referred to the Bosnian
authorities on September 29, 2005, and the adapted indictment was adopted on
December 7, 2005. See Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, First Report in the Case of
Defendant Radovan Stanković Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (Feb.
2006) [hereinafter First OSCE Report in Stanković], available at http://www.oscebih.org/
documents/14064-eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment Against Radovan Stanković, No.
KT-RZ-45/05 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/
optuznice/STANKOVIC_INDICTMENT.pdf. Gojko Janković was transferred on
December 8, 2005, and the adapted indictment was adopted on February 20, 2006. See
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required eight months in the case of Vladimir Kovačevič, but this
was predominantly due to Kovačevič’s health condition.241 The
Croatian prosecutor needed an entire year to adapt the
indictment in the trial of Ademi and Norac and, even then,
amended the indictment in May of 2008 after almost a year of
trial proceedings.242

Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE, First Report in the Case of Defendant Gojko
Janković Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter
First OSCE Report in Janković], available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/13969eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment Against Gojko Janković, No. KT-RZ-163/05 (Feb.
14,
2005),
available
at
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/optuznice/
jankovic_indictment.pdf. Paško Ljubičić was transferred on September 22, 2006, and the
adapted indictment was adopted on December 21, 2006. See Mission to Bosn. & Herz.,
OSCE, Second Report in the Paško Ljubičić Case Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to
Rule 11bis, at 1 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14054eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment Against Paško Ljubičić, No. X-KRN-06/241 (Dec.
15, 2006) available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//pasko_ljubicic__indictment_-_eng.pdf. Željko Mejakić, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević, and Momćilo
Gruban were transferred to Bosnian authorities on May 9, 2006, and the adapted
indictment was adopted on July 14, 2006. See Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, First
Report in the Željko Mejakić et al. Case Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis,
at 1 (Sept. 2006) [hereinafter First OSCE Report in Mejakić], available at
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14054-eng.pdf; see also Sud BiH, Indictment
Against Željko Mejakić, Momćilo Gruban, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević, No. KT-RZ91/06 (July 7, 2006) available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//
pasko_ljubicic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf.
241. Kovačević’s case was transferred on November 17, 2006, and the adapted
indictment was released by the Serbian prosecutor for war crimes on July 30, 2007. See
Prosecutor’s Second Progress Report at 1 n.1, ¶4, Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT01-42/2-I (Sept. 5, 2007); see also Okruzni sud Beogard [Belgrade District Court],
Indictment Against Vladimir Kovačević, No. KTZR 5/07 (July 26, 2007), available at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/optuznice/o_2007_07_26_eng.pdf. Kovačević’s
case was adjourned due to his mental state by the decision of the special chamber of the
Belgrade District Court on December 5, 2007. See Okruzni sud Beogard, Resenje o
odbecivanju optuznice [Resolution of the Indictment Decision], No. KTZR 5/07, Dec. 5,
2007, available at http://okruznisudbg.rs/content/2007godina/kovacevicvladimir/
indictment3/at_downoad.
242. The case was referred on September 14, 2005 and the adapted indictment was
released on November 22, 2006. See Mission to Croatia, OSCE, Background Report:
Domestic War Crimes Proceedings 2006 (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://www.osce.org/
documents/mc/2007/10/27566_en.pdf. The trial was concluded on May 30, 2008, with
Ademi acquitted and Norac convicted for the war crimes against civilians on the grounds
of command responsibility. See Presuda Županijski sud Zarebu [Zagreb County Court],
Republike Hrvatske v. Ademi & Norac, br. II K-rz-1/06, May 30, 2008, available at
http://www.centar-za-mir.hr/uploads/PRESUDA_Ademi_i_Norac.pdf. For a summary
of the arguments made on appeal, see Memorandum from Office in Zagreb, OSCE, to
Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY (Nov. 25, 2009), in Prosecutor’s Seventeenth Progress
Report, Annex A, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, No. IT-04-78-PT (Dec. 16, 2009),
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Another issue that may cause delays involves the transfer of
all material from The Hague to the relevant national court. Rule
11 bis(D)(iii) outlines the provision of all information that is
material to the indictment by the prosecutor.243 To assist the
process, the bench has reviewed existing national law and
identified some problems that are likely to arise in the process.
Moreover, it has suggested practical solutions on the basis of
domestically available provisions. Despite the bench’s optimistic
disposition,244 delays cannot be eliminated or fully anticipated. In
addition, the bench cannot decide, in lieu of a national court,
how these can be tackled.

available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/outreach/11bisreports/11bis_norac_ademi_
progressreport_17th.pdf.
243. See BiH Transfer Law art. 4, Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br.
61/2004, Dec. 29, 2004 (permitting the acceptance of facts or documentary evidence
already proven or admitted in a Tribunal proceeding). The issue raised by a number of
accused regarding the time it will take to translate materials from English into a
language they understand is of no consequence because the same problem would arise
even if trial were to take place before the Tribunal. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rašević &
Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 98 (July 8, 2005). Moreover, access to any confidential
material may be acheived by employing Rule 75. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 75 (Apr. 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1,
Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 24 (Sept. 1, 2005). Ultimately, the efficiency of the
procedure for accepting evidence and facts established by the ICTY largely depends on
the conduct of the parties. To this end, the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (“OSCE”) issued a recommendation in its Fourth Report on the Status of the
Rašević and Todović Case suggesting that “since the decision on taking judicial notice
may be issued late in the proceedings, for the purposes of judicial economy and to
ensure that parties are not placed at a disadvantage in the presentation of necessary
evidence, . . . the parties [should] submit any motion for judicial notice and the courts
to decide on such motions at the earliest stages of the proceedings possible.” Mission to
Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, Fourth Report in the Mitar Rašević and Savo Todović Case
Transferred to the State Court Pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14071-eng.pdf; see also Mission to Bosn. & Herz.,
OSCE, Second Report Case of Defendant Gojko Janković Transferred to the State Court pursuant
to Rule 11bis (July 2006), available at www.oscebih.org/documents/13970-eng.pdf;
Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, Fourth Report in the Paško Ljubičić Case Transferred to the
State Court pursuant to Rule 11bis (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.oscebih.org/
documents/14043-eng.pdf.
244. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 116 (July 20, 2005) (holding that
trials before national courts “may be sooner than in the Tribunal”). The Tribunal’s
optimism may not seem very realistic given the amount of such serious cases referred to
the national courts.
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It would be wrong to suggest that delays ensuing as a result
of referrals would a priori jeopardize international human rights
standards set out in the main human rights treaties and
developed through the practice of the international monitoring
bodies and judicial institutions.245 There is ample jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) on the issue
of delays and its impact on the right to a hearing within
reasonable time. The circumstances of each case have to be taken
into account, “in particular the complexity of the case, the
conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and the
importance of what was at stake for the applicant in litigation.”246
The ECtHR has never set any rigid time limits with regard to the
length of the proceedings in criminal cases. The court has stated
on many occasions that the principle of expedited hearing must
be taken into consideration in conjunction with the more
general principle of proper administration of justice.247 It is to be
expected that in fact-rich cases, where complex legal issues are at
stake, the proceedings will last longer than ordinary criminal or
civil cases. Such cases normally involve a greater body of evidence
as well as legal issues that take longer to resolve. A higher
threshold on the acceptability of delays is therefore to be
expected.
Another question is whether the referral bench can rely on
the findings of other international human rights institutions
when assessing the overall effectiveness of the national judicial
system for the purposes of referral. For example, would the
concluding observations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
in which the country in question had been found to
systematically violate the right to a fair hearing within a
reasonable time, compel the bench to deny referral to that
245. Although article 14 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights does not
contain any explicit reference to the factor of time as a substantial part of the due
process, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has established through its practice that
“the concept of a fair hearing necessarily entails that justice be rendered without undue
delay.” U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Communication No. 203/1986: Views of the
Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Muñoz-Hermoza v. Peru), ¶ 11.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/34/D/203/1986 (Nov. 4, 1988).
246. Humen v. Poland, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1168 (2001); see also Frydlender v.
France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶ 43.
247. See Boddaert v. Belgium, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. (Ser. A) 242, 257 (1993); Coëme v.
Belgium, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 133.
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country? The same question could be posed with respect to
repeated findings in judgments of the ECtHR concerning the
duration of national criminal proceedings in a specific country.248
There is no sufficiently relevant judicial precedent in any of
the countries considered for referrals that indicates that the right
to a hearing within reasonable time would be a significant
problem. Most of the ECtHR case law on the issue of the length
of proceedings concerns the judicial systems of Croatia249 and
Serbia.250 However, all of these cases cover civil matters.251 The
same is true with respect to cases that have arisen before the U.N.
Human Rights Committee.252 In the countries that have been
chosen for referrals, civil disputes are dealt with in separate
chambers from criminal law cases. Moreover, war crimes and
crimes against humanity are heard before chambers that are

248. There were numerous judgments in a series of unreported companion cases
on length of criminal proceedings before the Turkish Martial Law Courts. See, e.g.,
Bürkev v. Turkey, App. No. 26480/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Kanbur v. Turkey,
App. No. 28291/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Başpınar v. Turkey, App. No.
29280/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R.Oct. 30, 2001); Hasan Yağız v. Turkey, App. No. 31834/96 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Adıyaman v. Turkey, App. No. 31880/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30,
2001); Genç v. Turkey, App. No. 31891/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Pekdaş v.
Turkey, App. No. 31960/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Akçam v. Turkey, App. No.
32964/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Keskin v. Turkey, App. No. 32987/96 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Karademir v. Turkey, App. No. 32990/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30,
2001); Akyazı v. Turkey, App. No. 33362/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); İnan v.
Turkey, App. No. 39428/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001); Erdemli v. Turkey, App. No.
29495/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2001). These cases are available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
249. See, e.g., Napijalo v. Croatia, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 735 (2003); Aćimović v. Croatia,
2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Radoš v. Croatia, App. No. 45435/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 7,
2002); Delić v. Croatia, App. No. 48771/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 27, 2002). These cases
are available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
250. See, e.g., Mikuljanac v. Serbia, App. No. 41513/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 9, 2007);
Jevremović v. Serbia, App. No. 3150/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2007); Samardžić and
Plastika v. Serbia, App. No. 28443/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2007); Tomić v. Serbia,
App. No. 25959/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2007). These cases are available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
251. There are only three cases that have originated in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and concern the length of enforcement procedures in civil matters. See Pejaković v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 337/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2007); Karanović v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 39462/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 20, 2007); Jeličić v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (2006). These cases are available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
252. See HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/71/HRV (Apr. 30, 2001).
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equally distinct from the ordinary criminal law chambers.253 As a
result, the efficiency of the latter that should be individually
assessed in order to determine whether they are able to provide
fair trial within reasonable time to referred defendants.
One need only look to the actual length of proceedings in
referred cases at the national level. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
six cases involving nine indictees were completed by August 2009:
Dušan Fuštar, Momćilo Gruban, Gojko Janković, Duško Knežević,
Paško Ljubičič, Željko Mejakić, Mitar Rašević, Radovan Stanković,
and Savo Todović.254 Only the Trbić case is still in the trial
stage.255 Looking at the length of procedure, each case took
approximately two years from the time of referral to reaching
judgment in the first instance. In Croatia, the first instance
judgment in the case of Ademi and Norac was reached thirtythree months after the referral. The case of Vladimir Kovačevič,
which was referred to Serbia, is not representative because of the
accused’s health issues.256
Key to fair trial is the defendant’s access to counsel and
provision of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a
253. See ICTY, Capacity Building, http://www.icty.org/sid/240 (last visited Feb. 20,
2010) (stating that the chambers for war crimes were established within several county
courts in Croatia, the Belgrade District Court in Serbia, and the State Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina).
254. See, e.g., Sud BiH, Cases in Trial or on Appeal Against Verdict: K-KRŽ-05/70
Stanković
Radovan,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=20&zavrsen=
1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases with Second-Instance Verdicts
Delivered:
X-KR-06/241
–
Ljubičić
Paško,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/
?opcija=predmeti&id=37&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases
with Second-Instance Verdicts Delivered: X-KRŽ-05/161 – Janković Gojko,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=19&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited
Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases with Second-Instance Verdicts Delivered: X-KRŽ-06/200
– Mejakić Željko and Others, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=
33&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH, Cases with Second-Instance
Verdicts Delivered: X-KR-06/200-1 – Fuštar Duškan, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/
?opcija=predmeti&id=140&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); Sud BiH,
Cases with Second-Instance Verdicts Delivered: X-KRŽ-06/275 – Rašević and Another,
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=43&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last visited
Feb. 20, 2010); The cases against Mejakić and Fuštar were separated due to Dušan
Fuštar’s guilty plea during the closing stages of the trial. See ICTY, Status of Transferred
Cases, http://www.icty.org/sid/8934 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
255. See Sud BiH, Cases in Trial or on Appeal Against Verdict: X-KR-07/386 – Trbić
Milorad, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=predmeti&id=47&zavrsen=1&jezik=e (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
256. Press Release, ICTY, Vladimir Kovačevič Case Referred to Serbia, Doc. No.
CVO/MOW/1127e (Nov. 17, 2006).

BEKOU_K-FINAL

5/22/2010 2:51 PM

2010] AN EXAMINATION OF RULE 11 BIS OF THE ICTY

777

defense.257 Having counsel of the accused’s own choosing is
central to the right of fair trial.258 The right to counsel of one’s
own choosing is not, however, without limitation. An accused is
free to exercise this right provided that his counsel of choice is
entitled to appear before the relevant court.259 A side effect of
referrals might be that counsel who represented the accused
before the ICTY may not be entitled to appear before the courts
of the state in which the indictment is referred. This is due to the
potentially large number of states the bench may choose from,
under Rule 11 bis(A).260 Indeed, most states stipulate specific
conditions that have to be fulfilled before a lawyer is admitted for
practice before national courts.261 The bench acknowledged this
fact, but emphasised that the problem can be solved if special

257. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 75 (July 22, 2005) (rejecting the argument that the sixty-day
window contained in the BiH criminal code to schedule a trial after the initial
arraignment is undue because defense preparations should begin earlier); Prosecutor v.
Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11
bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 85 (July 8, 2005) (same).
258. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 231, art.
14(3)(b), 14(3)(d). But see HRC, Communication No. 283/1988: Views of the Human Rights
Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Little v. Jamaica), ¶ 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/283/l988
(Nov. 1, 1991) (noting that article 14(3)(d) “does not entitle the accused to choose
counsel provided to him free of charge”). But see also Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 223, art. 6(3)(c) (explaining that
the European Court of Human Rights sets numerous limits to the right for legal
assistance of the defendant’s own choosing); Croissant v. Germany, 237-B Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) (1992).
“[N]otwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer
and client, this right is not absolute.” Mayzit v. Russia, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 805, 818
(2006). The right to choose one’s counsel “is necessarily subject to certain limitations
where free legal aid is concerned and also where it is for the courts to decide whether
the interests of justice require that the accused be defended by counsel appointed by
them.” Id. Thus, a national court can override a defendant’s wishes when there are
sufficient grounds for doing so in the interest of justice. Id. (citing Croissant, 237-B Eur.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)).
259. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 21 (conditioning the right to counsel on
specific requirements); ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 44; see also Mayzit, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep.
at 818 (holding that the right to counsel is conditional on specific requirements being
met is the general practice of the European Court for Human Rights).
260. See ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(A).
261. See, e.g., Zakon o sudu Bosne i Hercegovine (pročišćeni tekst) [Law on the
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (revised text)] art. 12(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i
Hercegovine br. 49/2009, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/
docs/zakoni/en/law_on_court_of_bih_-_consolidated_text.pdf.
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admission is provided for in the states considered for referral.262
The bench also observed that the issue of counsel availability is
speculative at the time of the referral hearing.263 Whether any
lawyer will be allowed to appear before a given national court
postreferral should be of interest to the bench, but only insofar
as this will affect the ability of the accused to be represented by
counsel of his own choosing. Whether the same counsel
representing the accused before the ICTY will be able to
represent him after the referral has taken place should be of no
concern to the bench. The right to counsel is not breached by
referral.
Concerns have also been raised by accused who claimed that
the right to publicly paid counsel before the national courts is
limited when compared to the ICTY.264 On the issue of counsel
compensation, the bench was satisfied that a limited right to
publicly paid counsel exists, when the accused is not able to bear
the cost of legal representation.265 A potentially better legal aid

262. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 39 (July 20, 2005); see also Law on
the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (revised text) arts. 3.4(2), 12(2), Službeni glasnik
Bosne i Hercegovine br. 49/2009, June 22, 2009; ODSJEK KRIVIČNE ODBRANE
[DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE], SUD BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE, DODATNA PRAVILA
POSTUPANJA ZA ADVOKATE ODBRANE KOJI POSTUPAJU PRED ODJELOM I ZA RATNE
ZLOČINE I ODJELOM II ZA ORGANIZOVANI KRIMINAL, PRIVREDNI KRIMINAL I KORUPCIJU
SUDA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE [ADDITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURES FOR THE DEFENSE
COUNSEL BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT I FOR WAR CRIMES AND DEPARTMENT II FOR
ORGANIZED CRIME, CORPORATE CRIMES, AND CORRUPTION OF THE COURT OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA], available at http://www.okobih.ba/files/docs/Dodatna_pravila.pdf.
Serbian and Croatian laws do not provide for this possibility.
263. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint
Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 71 (Apr. 7, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 77–78 (July 22, 2005); Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 111–12; Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović,
Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶¶ 88–89 (July 8, 2005).
264. See Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 64; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 110; Janković, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 54.
265. See Mejakić, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 71; Rašević & Todović, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11
bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 88; Mejakić, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion
for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 111.
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system available at the ICTY does not impact whether the fair
trial criterion is satisfied.
The issue of self-representation in referred cases is another
consideration that needs to be addressed. While the ICTY
accepted that a defendant accused of the most serious crimes
could represent themselves,266 a number of jurisdictions—
particularly those belonging to the civil law tradition—do not
permit this arrangement.267 This is also true for countries that
comprise the former Yugoslavia.268 It has been reiterated both by
the ICTY269 and some scholars270 that the right of the accused to
represent himself is not absolute. The inquisitorial approach to
criminal procedure inherent to a civil law system enables the
judges to actively participate in the proceedings.271 Another
feature of such a system is that even when counsel has been
appointed, the defendant retains the right to participate in the
trial proceedings.272 As concluded by the ECtHR, the
appointment of counsel against the defendant’s will may be in
the interests of justice.273 These interests may include
266. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript of Record at 14574
(Dec. 18, 2002) (oral ruling of trial chamber on self-representation); see also Prosecutor
v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defence, ¶ 25 (May 9, 2003).
267. See, e.g., C. PR. PÉN. [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 274 (Fr.); UgolovnoProtsessual nyi Kodeks [Criminal Procedural Code] art. 51(1) (Russ.);
Strafprozeßordnung [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI] 253, as amended, §140(1)–(2) (F.R.G.).
268. See Code of Criminal Procedure for BiH art. 45(3), Službeni glasnik Bosne i
Hercegovine, br. 36/2003, Nov. 21, 2003; Code of Criminal Procedure for RH art. 65,
Narodne novine br. 62, Apr. 12, 2003; Code of Criminal Procedure for RS art. 71,
Službeni glasnik S.R. Srbije br. 46/2006, May 25, 2006; see also Mission to Bosn. & Herz.,
OSCE, Second OSCE Report in the Case of Defendant Radovan Stanković Transferred to the
State Court pursuant to Rule 11bis, at 1 (May 2006) [herainafter Second OSCE Report on
Stanković], available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/14066-eng.pdf (noting that
Stanković’s motion to represent himself during the proceedings was rejected).
269. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal on Assignment of Defence Counsel, ¶ 12 (Nov. 1, 2004).
270. See Nina H. B. Jorgensen, The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation Before
International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 711–26 (2004); see also Vojin
Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, Human Rights before the International Criminal Court, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: FROM DISSEMINATION TO APPLICATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
GÖRAN MELANDER 149, 163–65 (Jonas Grimheden & Rolf Ring eds., 2006).
271. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 353–76 (2d ed. 2008)
(exploring the differences between the two systems).
272. See Dimitrijevic & Milanovic, supra note 270, at 164.
273. See, e.g., Croissant v. Germany, 237-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 31–32 (1992);
see also Jorgensen, supra note 270, at 712, 715.
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guaranteeing efficiency of process, prevention of misconduct of
the accused, or securing competent defence in complicated
cases. Hence, it cannot be said that there is a breach of the right
to fair trial when the right to self-representation is restricted, as
long as the defendant has an opportunity to actively participate
and contribute to his defence.
The success of a trial relies upon evidence available to prove
or disprove the culpability of the accused. A major role in this
process is reserved for witnesses, whose availability is therefore
crucial. There is no guarantee that witnesses will be willing to
appear, and their availability may be influenced by perceptions of
neutrality of the state, difficulties in locating them due to
mobility during and after the conflict, fear of persecution by the
accused, and an assessment of the perceived risk of prosecution
for any of the crimes in question.274 Trial in the state where the
crime was committed might assist in securing the presence of
witnesses, because of the proximity to the territory of the
commission of the crime. This is yet another reason why the
selection of an appropriate state for referral is important.
Compelling witnesses to testify is a matter for national law and is
reserved for witnesses present within the territory of a state.275 For
witnesses located in other states, this would be a mutual legal
assistance issue. Regulated at the interstate level, witness
appearance will be facilitated by recourse to the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(“ECMA”),276 to which all states of the former Yugoslavia are
parties.277 The Tribunal, in its practice on the issue of witness
274. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 57 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-9623/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 79 (May 17, 2005); see also
Mission to Bosn. & Herz., OSCE, War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – Progress and Obstacles 23–28 (Mar. 23, 2005).
275. See Criminal Procedure Code of BiH art. 81, Službeni glasnik Bosne i
Hercegovine br. 36/2003, Nov. 21, 2003 (making witness testimony compulsory when
summoned); see also Zakon o sudskoj policiji Bosne i Hercegovine [Law on the Judicial
Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina] art. 5(1), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br.
21/2003, July 24, 2003.
276. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 20,
1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter European Assistance Convention].
277. See, e.g., Janković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 85;
Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for
Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 102 (July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević &
Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with
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availability, has reviewed the existence of provisions in national
legislation of the state concerned. The difficulties foreseen
regarding witness availability are likely to be greater at the
national level compared to trial before the ICTY, because as an
issue of interstate cooperation, states are allowed considerable
discretion to refuse the request.278 Such discretion is not available
when executing an ICTY cooperation request.279 This is not to
say, however, that appearance of witnesses before the Tribunal
has been trouble-free, nor that cooperation in general has always
been forthcoming.280 Regardless of the impact that the lack of an
international enforcement system has had on the effective
functioning and ultimate success of the Tribunal, the advantages
a coercive national system generally offers when compelling
witnesses to testify would not be applicable to witnesses residing
abroad.281
Another consideration relates to witness protection
measures available nationally. Whereas such measures have been

Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 93 (July 8, 2005); Stanković, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 82. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia also maintain several bilateral
agreements. See, e.g., Sporazum o saradnji u krivičnom gonjenju učinilaca krivičnih dela
protiv čovečnosti i drugih dobara zaštićenih međunarodnim pravom [Agreement on
Cooperation in the Prosecution of Perpetrators of Crimes Against Humanity and Other
Goods Protected by International Law], Monteneg.-Serb., Oct. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/saradnja/sporazum_trz_vdtrcg_lat.pdf;
Sporazum o saradnji u progonu učinilaca krivičnih dela ratnih zločina, zločina protiv
čovečnosti i genocida [Agreement on Cooperation in Prosecution of Perpetrators of
War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide], Serb.-Croat., Oct. 13, 2006,
available
at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/saradnja/
sporazum_trz_dorh_lat.pdf; Memorandum o saglasnosti u ostvarivanju i unapređenju
saradnje u borbi protiv svih oblika teškog kriminala [Memorandum of Understanding
on the Implementation and Promotion of Cooperation in Prosecution of All Forms of
Serious
Crime],
Bosn.
&
Herz.-Serb.,
July
1,
2005,
available
at
http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/saradnja/memorandum_rjt_trz_tbih_lat.pdf.
278. See European Assistance Convention, supra note 276, art. 2. Also of interest is
article 8 of the convention which does not attach any penalty to witnesses failing to
answer a summons to appear. Id. art. 8.
279. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 29.
280. See generally PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY
BEHIND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2004)
(providing an overview of state cooperation with the ICTY).
281. See Stanković, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 26 (noting
that the reference to cooperation in Security Council Resolution 1503 is superficial to
the point that it disregards the potential lack of domestic authority to obtain witnesses
and evidence).
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carefully crafted at the international level,282 the protection that
is provided for in national systems may not always rise to a similar
standard.283 The Tribunal recognised that measures aiming to
protect witnesses would promote their presence, but downplayed
the impact such measures (or the absence thereof) could have
on fair trial.284 This narrow approach is formalistic and fails to
assess the effect that refusal or reluctance of witnesses to appear
would have on fair trials. The inexperience of some national
courts in dealing with witness protection measures may lead to
serious violations of some of the most important due process
guaranties.285 A particular problem arises with regard to measures
adopted in the course of proceedings before the ICTY that are
no longer necessary postreferral. In the case of Željko Mejakić
before the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”), the
prosecutor required lifting of certain protective measures as
requested by some witnesses. The court rejected this motion, as
according to the decision of the referral bench in this particular
case, protective measures granted to victims and witnesses before
ICTY were to remain in force. It follows that the national court
does not have the jurisdiction to decide on this matter.
Consequently, protective measures had to remain in force
despite their no longer being needed.286

282. See Florence Mumba, Ensuring a Fair Trial whilst Protecting Victims and Witnesses
– Balancing of Interests, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 21, at 305, 359–71 (listing examples including
witness testimony via video conferencing and voice or image distortion).
283. See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecuting the Individuals bearing the Highest Level of
Responsibility, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 516, 519 (2004); Mark S. Ellis, Coming to Terms with its
Past – Serbia’s New Court for the Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 183–
84 (2004); Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute War Crimes: Proposed Paradigms
and Solutions, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 887, 892 (2006).
284. See Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 105 (July 8,
2005); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case
Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 89 (May 17, 2005).
285. For example, in the case of Radovan Stanković before the State Court of BiH,
the trial bench decided to exclude the public from all main trial proceedings. See Second
OSCE Report on Stanković, supra note 268, at 3–11. The bench was concerned, among
other issues, about the protection of witnesses. See id.
286. See First OSCE Report in Mejakić, supra note 240, at 3–6. Some cases also discuss
the practice of the European Court for Human Rights on the issue of protection of
witnesses. See Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647 (1998); Krasniki v.
Czech Republic, App. No. 51277/99, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2006).
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Detention on remand, primarily a question relating to the
right to liberty, also constitutes an important tool in securing the
presence of the accused and preserving the integrity of
evidence.287 Attention to the issue of detention has been paid
only in respect of prison conditions, and not in terms of the
duration of the pretrial detention.288 This is of particular
relevance to the added phase encountered in referral cases, that
of adaptation of an ICTY indictment by a national prosecutor.
The question that arises is whether the ICTY Order on Detention
remains in force after the referral has taken place and prevails
over the national legislation, or whether national courts ought to
review custody in accordance with nationally applicable rules.289
Rule 11 bis is silent in this regard. The ICTY Appeals Chamber
pronounced itself incompetent to decide on Janković’s motion
for provisional release after the decision on referral of his
indictment had been released.290 In order to avoid a situation in
which a person would be deprived of any legal remedies to
challenge his pretrial detention before the indictment had been
confirmed, thus constituting a violation of fundamental human
rights standards, the approach of the appeals chamber must be
interpreted as enabling the national courts, to which the
indictment had been transferred, to decide on this issue. The
national courts would therefore have the authority to at least
review an ICTY Order on Detention. Although it is clear that this
should take place under the law of the forum where the
indictment has been referred to, the possibility for a gap in the
law to exist is ever present. In particular, it is not clear what law
ought to be applied at the preadaptation of the indictment stage.
States in such position ought to either legislate for this possibility
or allow national courts to implement the rules on detention
applicable to the investigative phase of the proceedings by

287. See Dimitrijevic & Milanovic, supra note 270, at 160.
288. See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65, Decision on Joint Defence
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 56–62 (Apr.7, 2006);
Janković, Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis
Referral, ¶¶ 69–76 (Nov. 15, 2005).
289. See First OSCE Report in Janković, supra note 240, at 2–5; First OSCE Report in
Stanković, at 3–19.
290. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23, Decision on Appeal of the Trial
Chamber’s Decision on Provisional Release (Nov. 30, 2005).
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analogy.291 There is a strong argument in favor of the latter
approach because nothing prevents the introduction of new
counts to the indictment both in the stage of its adaptation or
afterwards.292
An examination into applicable law determines at best the
adequacy of the forum through an examination of the existence
of legislation. However, whether this suffices to guarantee a fair
trial for the accused is uncertain, particularly in the former
Yugoslavia where new and generally untested legislation is in
place. Such legislation has been criticised by both the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”)
and civil society.293 It is important to note that each case is to be
examined in concreto. The bench could consider the criticisms
expressed regarding the framework in place but it would be
unable practically to offer any solution, as this would exceed its
mandate. Some discussion on the available legal framework may
prove helpful to the domestic court, which may be faced with
similar issues in the future. Highlighting potential problems
helps, but remains abstract and of limited use to the national
system. Issues pertaining to fair trial that may have arisen in one
case, may of course be of no relevance to another, unless there
are systemic failures of the national courts. This is why the bench
examines fair trial as part of the availability of the system and
raises queries through the decisions on further information and

291. See BiH Transfer Law art. 2(2), Službeni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine br.
61/2004, Dec. 29, 2004.
292. In practice the State Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina has added
additional counts on the adapted indictment. See Sud BiH, Inditment Against Trbić
Milorad, No. X-KR-07/386 (July 20 2007), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/
docs/optuznice/2007/milorad_trbic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf; Sud BiH, Indictment
Against Željko Mejakić, Momćilo Gruban, Dušan Fuštar, Duško Knežević, No. KT-RZ91/06 (July 7, 2006) available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//
pasko_ljubicic_-_indictment_-_eng.pdf; Sud BiH, Indictment Against Radovan
Stanković, No. KT-RZ-45/05 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/
files/docs/optuznice/STANKOVIC_INDICTMENT.pdf; Sud Bosne i Hercegovine,
Second Indictment Against Gojko Janković, No. KT-RZ-163/05 (July 4, 2005), available at
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/optuznice//gojko_jankovic_-_indictment_-_eng__04july2006.pdf.
293. See Ellis, supra note 283, at 168 (assessing Serbian courts before the creation of
the war crimes court); see also Brady Hall, Using Hybrid Tribunals as Trivias: Furthering the
Goals of Post-Conflict Justice while Transferring Cases from the ICTY to Serbia’s Domestic War
Crimes Tribunal, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 39, 50–53 (2005) (exploring issues of legitimacy
of Serbian criminal courts); Zoglin, supra note 206, at 44–72.
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through monitoring, which is used by the bench as a means of
determining that the fair trial requirement has been met.294
The assessment of the bench would have been more
accurate and complete had a body of national jurisprudence
been developed following referrals. Only a close examination of
such jurisprudence would have been possible to assess the
application of the existing legal framework to the referred cases
to discern whether the fair trial requirement is met in practice.
The early practice is not very encouraging. Of the issues
discussed above, the lack of competence by national courts
curtails their ability to tackle practical problems in a constructive
way. Fair trial is only discussed in the broadest possible terms
focusing on specific themes. Fair trial as a prerequisite for
referral is pivotal, but the bench’s limited remit does not allow
for a detailed investigation into the specifics both in terms of
scope and in terms of the timing of its determination prior to
referral. This oversight of Rule 11 bis is partly rectified through
monitoring, which this Article will return to shortly.
B.

Sentencing Issues and Quality of Prisons

Although the requirement in Rule 11 bis relating to
sentencing was of greater relevance at the time the rule was first
adopted, it is not currently of any practical relevance, given that
the death penalty has been abolished in the states of former
Yugoslavia.295 The quality of prisons is of more importance. Steps
have been taken to ameliorate prison conditions and it is
therefore unlikely that such conditions will affect the decision to
refer.296 This may explain why the ICTY’s treatment of this issue is
generally very brief.297
294. See infra Part IV.
295. All states of the former Yugoslavia are parties to Protocol Number 13 to the
European Convention on Human Rights. See Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of
the Death Penalty in all Circumstances, May 3, 2002, 2246 U.N.T.S. 110; see also Council
of Eur., Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all
circumstances,
CETS
No.: 187,
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/commun/
cherchesig.asp?nt=187&cm=&df=&cl=eng (Mar. 9, 2010) (listing signatories to the
additional protocol).
296. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment has been strongly involved in monitoring prison
conditions in the former Yugoslavia and posts reports regarding each state. See Council
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A quite separate sentencing issue is the possibility that the
accused, whose indictment has been referred to a national court,
may receive a much higher sentence than the one he would have
received had he been tried in The Hague.298 This is not an issue
that needs to be examined at the time of deciding a referral. As
long as the sentence imposed nationally is in line with the
sentencing practice of that state for similar offences, this would
not be a fair trial issue to be considered by the Tribunal.
Inevitably, the generally lower sentences imposed by the Tribunal
will not be replicated before national courts. This certainly
constitutes a paradox when looked at from the perspective of
indictments referred to national courts on the basis of their lower
gravity, but it does not and should not affect referrals.
IV. MONITORING OF NATIONAL PROCEEDINGS299
Rule 11 bis(D)(iv) enables the prosecutor to send observers
to monitor the proceedings before the national court to which
the indictment is referred.300 The discretionary language of this
rule means that the prosecutor is not under an obligation to do
so and may choose to entirely forego any form of monitoring.301
of Eur., Council for the Prevention of Torture, States: Documents and Visits,
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states.htm (Last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
297. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral
of Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶¶ 72–76 (July 25, 2005).
298. Gojko Janković was sentenced to thirty-four years of imprisonment following
the referral of his indictment for trial before the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber. See
Criminal Gets 34 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A8. For a quick comparison, the
different sentencing span employed by the ICTY and the Serbian courts for cases arising
out of the crimes committed in Vukovar, Croatia are of interest. The ICTY trial chamber
acquitted Miroslav Radić, and sentenced the commander of the Serbian forces, Mile
Mrkšić, who was responsible for the murder of two hundred people in Ovcara, near
Vukovar, to twenty years imprisonment. See Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 713 (Sept. 27, 2007). Veselin Šljivančanin, another high profile Serbian
military officer that took part in the Vukovar battle was sentenced to five years
imprisonment. See id. ¶ 716. The Serbian court, for the same crime of murder of two
hundred civilians in Ovcara, sentenced seven people to twenty years imprisonment, five
to eighteen, and three to fifteen years, including those who were part of the shooting
squad. See Presuda Ovčaru [Verdict for Ovcar], RADIO-TELEVIZIJA SRBIJE (Belgrade), Mar.
19,
2009,
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/135/Hronika/49514/
Presude+za+Ovčaru+.html.
299. ICTY Manual on Developed Practices, supra note 67, at 170–71.
300. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(D)(iv).
301. See id. (utilizing the word “may” instead of “shall”). Despite this element of
discretion, the Referral Bench has in practice always imposed this extra level of scrutiny
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Monitoring was envisaged as a mechanism enabling observers in
domestic trials to oversee the proceedings and report back to
The Hague, and thereby allowing the Office of the Prosecutor
(“OTP”) to request the revocation of the referral under Rule 11
bis(F).302 Due to the time constraints set by the Tribunal’s
completion strategy, it is unrealistic to expect that any cases will
be deferred back to the ICTY. The effect of monitoring is
preemptive. States wishing to avoid having the case removed
from their national courts and taken back to The Hague are
more likely to abide by international standards.303 Moreover,
depending on the quality of the observers and the efficacy of the
reporting system in place, some streamlining might be achieved
at the international level. It will be useful for the future to create
an extensive archive of such reports so that they can be used by
similar adjudicative efforts elsewhere. Moreover, an accurate
snapshot of national prosecutions at any given time may assist the
ICTY prosecutor in concentrating his efforts on the remainder of
the trials before the Tribunal.
In most instances, this monitoring task is not undertaken by
OTP directly but has been entrusted to the OSCE.304 This type of
“outsourcing” is well within the prosecutor’s powers and given
the significant experience the OSCE possesses in this field, the

from the Prosecutor’s office on a referred indictment. See Tolbert & Kontic, supra note
20, at 154.
302. ICTY Rules, supra note 3, R. 11 bis(F). Note that revocation will be done under
the deferral provisions, so this must be accomplished prior to the conclusion of the
national trial. See id. Even though this is not mentioned in Rule 11 bis (F), it would be
obvious that if the ICTY wanted to try a defendant after the conclusion of his trial before
a national court, it would have to invoke the exception to the non bis in idem provision
found in article 10 ICTY Statute. See ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 10; see also Katrina
Gustafson & Nicole Janisiewicz, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1091, 1117–18 (2008).
303. Accordingly, the referral bench has charged the prosecutor to monitor every
referred case allowing not just oversight of the individual case, but also encouraging fair
trial guarantees and diligent prosecution in any subsequent or concurrent referrals. See
Request by the Prosecutor Under Rule 11 bis: Partly Confidential (Attached Schedules to
Annex I Filed Confidential), ¶ 57, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT
(Sept. 2, 2004).
304. See Permanent Council, OSCE, Decision No. 673: Co-operation Between the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, No. PC.DEC/673 (May 19, 2005), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/pdf_documents/2005/05/14401-1.pdf.
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outcome of the monitoring process should be far superior
compared to monitoring undertaken in house.305
Although the rule regarding monitoring only refers to the
prosecutor, in practice it has been of relevance to both the
defense and the bench.306 The latter has incorporated
monitoring in the examination of the fair trial requirement. The
absence of a concrete test for the assessment of fair trial prior to
referral, has led the bench to adopt a more hands-on approach
on the issue, which includes ordering the prosecutor to monitor
national trials and to provide reports to that effect after referral
has taken place.
The first issue that arises is whether the bench acted within
its powers when ordering the prosecutor to monitor national
proceedings.307 The answer to this has to be in the affirmative. As
convincingly explained in the Stanković appeal, “a Chamber of
Judges may issue orders to the prosecutor as a party to a case
before it. So long as the orders are reasonably related to the
Chamber’s mandate in the case before it, they fall within the
Chamber’s inherent powers.”308
A more interesting question relates to whether the bench
may rely on the monitoring in order to reach its decision in
favour of referral, which renders monitoring an essential part of
the fair trial test. The Tribunal has vociferously stressed that it

305. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc./RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (urging “States and
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment
and services to the International Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel”).
Monitoring by the OSCE would clearly fall under this provision. Id.
306. See Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 103 (July 22, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. IT-02-65PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion for Referral of Case Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, ¶ 103
(July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rašević & Todović, Case No. IT-97-25/1-PT, Decision on
Referral of Case Under Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annexes I and II, ¶ 111 (July 8,
2005) (observing that the prosecutor may disregard the interests of the defense);
Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 bis, ¶ 94 (May 17, 2005).
307. The prosecutor submitted that monitoring in Rule 11 bis is envisaged “on
behalf of” the prosecutor—not the referral bench—and maintained that the bench in
issuing orders acted “ultra vires.” Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2AR11bis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶¶ 44–45 (Sept. 1, 2005).
308. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 54; see also Prosecutor v. Mejakić,
Case No. IT-02-65-AR11bis, Decision on Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on
Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 93 (Apr. 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Janković, Case No. IT-9623/2-AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 62 (Nov. 15, 2005).
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has the authority to satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair
trial. In the view of the bench,
whatever information the Referral Bench reasonably feels it
needs and whatever orders it reasonably finds necessary, are
within the Referral Bench’s authority so long as they assist
the Bench in determining whether the proceedings
following the transfer will be fair. The Referral Bench must
bear in mind the considerable discretion that the Rule
affords the Prosecutor, but always the ultimate inquiry
remains the fairness of the trial the accused will receive.309

The approach of the bench has altered the rationale behind the
adoption of the monitoring provision in the RPE. It is beyond
doubt that the bench has the ability to order the prosecutor to
conduct monitoring. Deciding in favor of referrals on the basis of
availability of subsequent monitoring, however, is not grounded
in Rule 11 bis. The objection is not so much because monitoring
is being employed in a manner different to its originally intended
use, but because the bench finds that the fairness requirement
has been satisfied on the basis of a mechanism (i.e. monitoring),
which has yet to take place.
The bench has to be admired for its ingenuity. It is hoped
that by using monitoring in such a way, the limited scope Rule 11
bis contemplates regarding the examination of the fair trial
requirement will be overcome. The burden is shifted away from
the Tribunal so that it can proceed with the referral. Despite the
limited insight into fair trial at the time of the referral hearing,
subsequent monitoring offers relief to the bench.
CONCLUSION
The pressing need to conclude the trials before the ad hoc
international tribunals contributed to reverting cases back to
national courts. However, this approach would have never been
adopted were it not for a significant shift in the political attitude
and the ability of the judiciaries in the affected states. While it is
still early to assess whether the national trials on referred cases
will satisfy the interests of justice since the final decision has been

309. Stanković, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, ¶ 50; see also Mejakić, Decision on
Joint Defence Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11 bis, ¶ 92.
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reached in six of them;310 it must be said that these cases, along
with numerous other national trials, have contributed in
overturning the presumption that prosecution for core
international crimes is better served by international tribunals. In
the inception of the tribunals, national courts were deemed unfit
to deal with such serious cases. The recent emphasis placed on
national courts is not only due to improvement on the situation
on the ground, but may be largely attributed to the fact that the
ICTY is reaching the end of its life. Referrals, encouraged by the
completion strategy, belatedly rectify the noninvolvement of
national legal orders in most part of the Tribunal’s work.
Although concurrent jurisdiction has always played a key part in
the ICTY Statute, the real shift came with the need to complete
more cases prior to the termination of its functions. Concurrent
jurisdiction was therefore reinterpreted to enable referrals of
indictments to national courts.
Rule 11 bis is not perfect, however. The referral practice
reveals numerous shortcomings in the process. The superficial
examination of the suitable forum and applicable law criteria has
already led to some practical problems. The (almost) total
reliance on the principle of territoriality heavily burdens the
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina with all but two cases
referred to its War Crimes Chamber. With more than eighty
other indictees and considerably more modest resources than
those at the ICTY, the state court will undoubtedly have great
problems in dealing with the entrusted cases. At the same time,
the dropping of some of the charges in the case of Ademi &
Norac, and the inability of the Croatian prosecutor to amend the
indictment in order to include all forms of command
responsibility of the accused, led to the acquittal of one and to
the very lenient conviction of the other.311 The trial of Kovačevič,
the only case referred to Serbia, has not even commenced due to
the inability of the accused to stand trial, a fact that was wellknown to the ICTY before the referral took place.
Notwithstanding these problems, the fact that practically all
of the states from the affected territory received at least one case
from the ICTY shows that the criminal justice systems in these
countries have achieved a certain level of respect and trust
310. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 9.
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amongst the international community. The opportunity to
exercise jurisdiction in such serious cases involving grave
breaches of humanitarian and human rights law represents an
opportunity for further empowerment of the national legal
systems in the Balkans.
Although, owing to time constraints, it is highly unlikely that
there will be any further referrals, it is expected that national
jurisdictions will have to tackle the numerous cases that did not
reach the ICTY.312 The experience gained through their
cooperation with the ICTY will be most valuable in these future
national prosecutions. In addition, mutual cooperation and
judicial assistance between the judiciaries from the region needs
to be strengthened and supported, primarily from the
perspective of the exchange of experiences. This is not only in
the service of the past. Effective prosecution of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide on a national level will
contribute to the prevention of future crimes. But the lessons
learned from the ICTY episode will be of the utmost importance
also for the permanent International Criminal Court, which will
face similar challenges when interacting with national courts.313

312. Particularly with the genesis of so-called “Category 2 cases,” knowledge
transfers between the Tribunal and national prosecution agencies consisting of evidence
and other investigatory information were never actively pursued by the prosecutor due
to the office’s need to focus entirely on the most serious crimes before it. This legacy
demonstrates how far the shattered legal systems of former Yugoslavian states,
particularly BiH, have come, but also the way that the relationship between those
nations and the Tribunal has itself matured. See Tolbert & Kontic, supra note 20, at 157.
313. Indeed, it has been suggested that a “positive complementarity” model, along
the lines of article 11 bis, ought to be adopted by the ICC in some form, with the aim of
encouraging dialogue between the national and international strata of criminal
accountability. E.g., David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 1281, 1293–94 (2009).

